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Abstract 
 
Sudan is a state that has become synonymous with violent atrocities resulting from clashes 
between government forces and rebel groups  The resulting death and displacement of scores 
of its civilians as a result of these clashes has captured the world’s attention and inspired an in 
depth analysis for the causes. This research report explores the impact that the political 
decision making by the postcolonial government in the form of rationality had on this 
circumstance and to what extent the governance procedure influenced the tensions that 
catapulted the state into violence. The North South, Muslim Christian dichotomy has been 
understood as the crux of the violence in Sudan, the reality however is much more complex and 
a variety of intricate factors converge to result in the spate of violent atrocities that has been 
suffered mostly by those who are not participants in the conflicts. Sudan’s history and its 
successive postcolonial governments are two factors that weigh greatly on these complexities, 
the process of political rationality in particular is central to this and as such forms the crux of 
the political decision making process by the governing structure. The analysis of political 
rationality as a concept provides an insight into the context that framed this process and is 
therefore vital to consider in trying to decipher and mitigate against the occurrence of further 
violent atrocities in Sudan specifically and generally in Africa as a whole.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Violence can never be understood solely in terms of its physicality-force, assault or the 
infliction of pain-alone. Violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of 
worth, or value of the victim. The social and cultural dimensions of violence are what gives 
violence its power and meaning. Focusing exclusively on the physical aspects of 
torture/terror/violence misses the point and transforms the project into a clinical, literary, or 
artistic exercise, which runs the risk of degenerating into theatre or pornography of violence in 
which the voyeuristic impulse subverts the larger project of witnessing, critiquing and writing 
against violence, injustice and suffering” 
-Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgoeis, Violence in War and Peace (2004:1) 
The above quote puts in detail the complex nature of violence and violent conflict. It outlines 
how violence is not a singular event that suddenly occurs and just as suddenly dissipates. It 
highlights how whenever there is an occurrence of violence, there has been a build up to its 
eventual outbreak, and there have been a number of factors that have contributed to it and 
made its occurrence all the more likely. There are undeniable psychological, social, political and 
economic factors at play that have to be considered when assessing the nature of violence.  
This is true of all places where there is an occurrence of violence and atrocity, globally as well as 
from a continental perspective.  
The African continent has become synonymous with an extensive range of violent atrocities, 
from genocide to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The continent has, since 
decolonization, been plagued with atrocities that contribute to the pervasively entrenched 
notion of Africa as the ‘dark continent.’ This dark continent narrative is not a novel 
conceptualization, but has been propagated as the African condition since the nineteenth 
century. This is evidenced by literary works such as Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, 
published in 1899, where he depicts Africa as a place of darkness and destitution, void of any 
hope for improvement and too harsh for human existence. This depiction is part of a greater 
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narrative that speaks to the randomization of violence on the continent. By randomization I am 
referring to the process of conceptualizing violence and unrest on the continent as being 
inexplicable, seemingly occurring at a whim, often without reason and unnecessarily 
horrendous. From this standpoint, violence and atrocity are the essence of the African 
condition.   
The colonization of Africa has been a topic of great debate and exhaustive consideration and as 
much as there are theories pertaining to violence and atrocity, there are perhaps twofold the 
number of theories pertaining to the colonial history of the continent and the subsequent 
process of decolonization. The colonial structure is critical to both the presence of violence 
during colonial occupation and after independence as well as the postcolonial structure in its 
entirety. Postcolonial governments have undertaken specific decision making processes that 
has ignited and sustained violence on the continent and to this end it is necessary to assess the 
extent to which political rationality influences the contemporary patterns of violence and 
atrocity that take place on the continent, specifically using the case of Sudan as a point of 
analysis.  
By its very construct, political rationality speaks to an overarching sense of agency that does not 
make concessions for circumstances that occur outside the immediate political process which 
are not based upon personal reasoning and an entrenched set of convictions. Political 
rationality pronounces that the application of outcomes is fundamentally based on the 
calculation of the variables that are available to those employing this thought process. In the 
political sense, rationality is more about the maximization of power. Those seeking power or 
occupying positions of power and influence would employ rationality in line with expanding this 
power and maintaining its longevity.  
Sudan is one of the many African countries that has experienced consistent unrest and 
violence. The years of conflict and violence have far outweighed the years of peace in this 
North-Eastern African state. Identity, geography, race, religion and governing structures all 
converge to result in the relentless battle between the government of Sudan and emerging 
rebel factions, such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Justice and 
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Equality Movement (JEM). The thought provoking factor about Sudan is how race and religion 
are at the core of this friction and how they have been used by all those engaged in battle to 
advance their cause and weaken and demean the cause of their adversaries. Those at the helm 
of power in Sudan, from its earliest colonizers right up until its independent government, have 
all engaged with the dynamics of race and religion in a manner that have frequently triggered 
violent atrocities which routinely come at the expense of the civilian population 
This report analyses interconnections between governance and political rationality in the 
postcolonial state. The report also explores the contentious role of identity politics and how 
these have immense bearing on the conceptualization of nationalism and how in a state such as 
Sudan that has numerous competing identities pertaining to race, culture and religion, a unified 
sense of nationalism is something which has eluded the respective postcolonial governments.   
It explores how decision making processes affect contemporary patterns of violence by using 
the case of Sudan and its protracted history of conflict and strife for an empirical analysis which 
helps to scaffold the theoretical framework. This theoretical framework can be applied to a 
greater African context when evaluating the politics of the post colony, colonial history, 
colonialism and governing structures in continental Africa. Empirically, by using Sudan as a case 
study this report seeks to determine the answer to the question: to what extent does political 
rationality influence the contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity in postcolonial Sudan?  
Secondary research questions include: 
a) What role does Sudan’s colonial history play in the violent atrocities that have taken 
place since independence? 
b) How has the governance of postcolonial Sudan affected the balance of peace in 
postcolonial Sudan? 
The research questions were chosen on the basis of seeking to establish the various ways in 
which political rationality affects the violence that has engulfed Sudan since independence. 
Sudan, like the majority of African states has been previously colonised; it therefore stands to 
reason that this past will form an integral part of the analysis. The manner in which a state is 
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governed is a crucial part of the political rationality process and as such governance and how it 
has impacted on violent atrocities in Sudan must be explored. Related to these questions is the 
choice of using a single case study with broader applications. Sudan as a single case study 
provides a pertinent insight into how the choices made by the postcolonial state converge with 
the inherited legacies of colonial rule. The states complex colonial history, the nature of 
frequent and reoccurring civil war, genocide in the Darfur region and the secession of the South 
to form its independent state are some of the factors that require a deeper understanding of 
the context in which they occur. Some of the leading theorists whose work I will be drawing 
upon include Michel Foucault, William Riker and Bernard Williams who have covered the aspect 
of rationality to varying degrees. On the analysis of Sudan, the leading scholars whose work has 
been consulted include Jok Madut Jok, Andrew Natsios, Douglas Johnson and Ann Mosley 
Lesch. 
The research methodology used was through secondary literature since there is an existing 
wealth of knowledge and I want to interpret it using the conceptual framework of political 
rationality. The data collection method was qualitative and the choice of Sudan as a case study 
provides a pertinent insight into how the choices made by the postcolonial state converge with 
the inherited legacies of colonial rule. The states complex colonial history, the nature of 
frequent and reoccurring civil war, genocide in the Darfur region and the secession of the South 
to form its independent state are some of the factors that require a deeper understanding of 
the context in which they occur. The time period covered spans from the 1860’s when the 
Turco-Egyptian coalition first colonised Sudan up until 2011 when the Southern part secedes to 
form its independent state of South Sudan. The focus of this paper does not extend beyond the 
secession since I intend to give a holistic account of the various factors that influence violence 
and atrocity from colonisation, to independence and through to secession. The focus of the 
research is therefore not specifically about the split from the North but rather that 
characteristic forms an integral part of the overall scenario that I endeavour to elucidate.  
The report is divided into six chapters in total, this being the first chapter will introduce the 
topic whilst chapter two focuses on the concept of political rationality and how it is both 
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influenced by and influences identity in the postcolonial spaces. This chapter delves into the 
analysis of motivating factors behind Sudan’s political choices and in what instances can it be 
said that these political choices were a means to an end as well what ends in particular were 
envisaged by the governing structures. This chapter also looks into how rationality is influenced 
by historical and colonial aspects which brings into question the common assumption that 
rationality is a predominantly individualistic process This chapter seeks to comprehend how 
rationality, even as a process of weighing odds against each other, can be impacted by the 
environment in which the actors employing said rationality exist. This chapter also seeks to 
discount the notion that independence from colonial rule equates with absence from colonial 
influence. This is particularly in relation to the governing structures that have been either 
influenced by colonial rule or were established by them and taken over by incoming 
independent governments. This chapter also looks into the various forms in which political 
rationality manifests itself, as it is not a uniform process and the type of political circumstances 
determines the form of political rationality that will be applied.  
Chapter three will discuss what the political legacies of colonial rule are so as to measure how 
they have influenced the post colony and in particular which of these general inclinations can 
be identified in the Sudan case study. This chapter provides the context of the state of Africa at 
the time of independence and how historical factors have impacted on the post colony in 
general and on Sudan in particular This chapter occupies an essential role in the context of the 
broader report as it is important that the type of colonial legacies which the discussion seeks to 
expound on be clarified. The legacies of colonialism are numerous and are all interconnected; 
political, economic and social, albeit these legacies influence each other it is crucial, for the 
purposes of this discussion, in particular for the assessment on political rationality that political 
legacies be treated as paramount and therefore require a focused level of analysis. Political 
legacies also focus quite intensely on governance, government and political systems, all of 
which are important in the analysis of Sudan’s respective eras of rule. The legislative, 
constitutional and bureaucratic institutions inherited by newly independent states from their 
colonial predecessors have undoubtedly had extensive challenges, which have resulted in 
disastrous political consequences. It is imperative to analyse how the nature of this inheritance, 
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has affected in particular the state of Sudan. This chapter seeks to outline a trajectory between 
the commonalities of the colonial epochs and how they compare with and influence 
governance in the postcolonial state.  
Chapter four is the beginning of the empirical analysis which seeks to incorporate the 
theoretical framework from chapter two and three into the broader discussion of violence and 
atrocity. Sudan as a case study provides a pertinent insight into how the choices made by the 
postcolonial state converge with the inherited legacies of colonial rule.  In this chapter Sudan’s 
earlier colonial occupation, prior to the later British rule as well as the latter period of the 
British-Egyptian condominium will be the focal point of discussion.  
This period of Sudan’s colonization establishes much of the challenges pertaining to race, 
identity and religion that plague Sudan throughout this period of colonisation and also into the 
post colony. Sudan’s colonial period is intricate in that it highlights the convoluted nature of 
colonisation, specifically with respects to the role that the Egypt, another African country plays 
in this process. Sudanese colonisation forces us to have a broader understanding of what it 
means to be colonised and what it means to be the colonizer and how in the case of Egypt 
which has simultaneously occupied both roles with regards to relations with Sudan these 
factors come together to affect the future process of governance and also the variety of 
outcomes result from this duality and what implications they have on the future of the 
colonised country. This chapter seeks to determine what factors in Sudan’s colonial period have 
influenced, in particular the postcolonial rationality process which is complicit in the country’s 
contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity. This chapter also builds on some themes from 
the first chapter surrounding issues of violence, dominance, coercion and brutality. 
Whereas chapter two addressed these issues more broadly from a continental perspective, this 
chapter will relay how these themes find expression in colonial Sudan and illustrates the exact 
form in which the colonizers implemented them. Chapter five provides the in-depth analysis 
into Sudan’s postcolonial sphere. This chapter links the colonial and the postcolonial by 
commencing with an analysis of Sudan as it was on the cusp of independence. This chapter will 
analyse the role of Sudanese state action, how ongoing crises of governance are implicated in 
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the contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity. The series of events that take place in the 
immediate moments prior to British departure from the country are crucial to comprehending 
the process of violence and unrest which followed independence. Sudan’s civil wars, the 
conflict in Darfur as well as the eventual secession of South Sudan are all aspects that are 
covered in this chapter. What is of most significance is how these occurrences are reinforced by 
the combination of colonial influence and postcolonial rationality. The Sudanese government 
has been criticised extensively for its response and even more so for its implicit involvement in 
the perpetuation of the atrocities against the people in its Southwestern Darfur region. That 
aspect of the Sudanese government’s negligence and complicity in the atrocities suffered by its 
people speaks directly to the process of political rationality, how the choices that led to these 
atrocities were made and why they were made.  This chapter illustrates how at the epicentre of 
each contentious moment, the two factors of political rationality and colonial legacy have been 
intertwined and have exacerbated the nature of ensuing violence and atrocity.  
 Chapter six is the final chapter in the report and provides the concluding remarks as well as the 
findings that come as a result of the analysis of all arguments covered in the report. In the 
conclusion the synthesis of the reports empirical findings relating to the case study of Sudan 
will be captured. This aspect of the conclusion gives insight into how this case study gives 
validity to the overall theoretical framework as well as the characteristic trajectory of violence 
in the instance of disparities. The conclusion also presents a way forward in terms of possible 
future research on this topic in its entirety and provides insight into the possibility of future 
research, based on the sub-topics that have emerged. The limitations of the research in its 
entirety will also be covered in the conclusion.   
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Chapter 2: Political rationality at the intersection of colonial and postcolonial 
African identities and realities 
 
The concept of rationality is one which is traditionally associated with the economic and 
numerical denominations and not typically with the social sciences. As will be evidenced in this 
chapter, the lack of rationality theory in particular the political sphere is not an indication of its 
impracticality as a theorem which can be used in the social sciences.  Rationality as used by 
game theorists and economists can be established as a practical scope for analysis in the study 
of politics. This chapter therefore seeks to assess how rationality plays out in politics, 
particularly how instrumental it was at the dawn of independence. Rationality implies a process 
of evaluation. ‘Rational’ decisions are those which are taken after careful consideration and 
assessment of all available options. If that is the case, what, if any role does extenuating 
influence, in particular the influence of colonialism plays in this process? The following chapter 
seeks to demonstrate the cataclysmic effects of colonialism on the independent postcolonial 
states of Africa.  This diagnosis is crucial in the process of employing insight into the 
contemporary patterns of violence and finding viable solutions to this burden that has plagued 
most of postcolonial Africa.  
This chapter is organised into three sections. In section one I explore the meaning of the term 
political rationality. This delineation is quite important to the rest of the chapter and to the 
report in its entirety because it explicates the term, which as the report expounds on, is 
conceptualized differently by various theorists. The principle aim of this section is therefore to 
provide the scope of what political rationality entails so that the subsequent sections can 
illustrate how colonial rule has infiltrated this scope to impact on the patterns of violence and 
atrocity that have been experienced in the post colony.  
 In the second section I analyse how political rationality shapes political behaviour in 
postcolonial Africa. This analysis is necessary because of the correlation that rationality has with 
the decisions taken by postcolonial governments that have either resulted in violence atrocities 
or alternatively impacted on the already existing atrocities. On the basis of this analysis I argue 
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that there is a particular trajectory towards decision-making taken by leaders in governing 
structures that determines the political, administrative and socio-economic stance of the post 
colony. In this section I will be focusing on the individualistic aspect of rationality so that in the 
following section I will be able to bring in the peripheral factors that will clarify why this process 
occurs in the manner that it does. In the final section as I have mentioned I build on the second 
section by bringing in and explaining the underlying grounds that influence the process of 
political rationality in postcolonial African states. This section of the report ties together the 
meaning and strategy of political rationality as it is undertaken after independence to the 
continuing legacy of colonial rule and illustrates the extent of its reach and its influence on 
contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity in particular the case of Sudan.  
2.1 What is political rationality? 
The concept of political rationality is complex. It consists of varied interpretations, which must 
have their core elements analysed in order for it to be effectively applied to the state of 
postcolonial Africa. Michel Foucault in particular primarily concerns the theory that has been 
explored with the specific type of rationality that the formation of the state produces (Wilder, 
2003). Each state, at various points in history, has a unique trajectory along which its 
administrative and other governance structures are formed. The differences that influence the 
respective trajectories are informed by specific doctrines and questions put forward by the 
changing times. Regime changes, economic upheavals and in the case of African states the 
move from being colonies to autonomous states are all examples of changing times and the 
questions that those in governance positions would be faced with.   Rationality is a political 
process that occurs independently but is not completely absolved of influence from the 
economic and other social influences (Wilder, 2003).  
Rationality as a political process refers to the political science objective that stem from a 
concentrated analysis of how power is balanced amongst the varying systems of governance.  
Within this spectrum of political science the activity of political rationality follows a process of 
the political climate creating a set of circumstances that compel political actors to institute 
actions based on a set of envisaged outputs.  
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At this point it must be emphasized that political rationality is not simply another term for 
political choices; in fact, political choices and political rationality are more prone to exist as 
mutually exclusive concepts. In the first instance it must be understood that political choice is 
an umbrella term for a number of choice actions including sanctioned choice, where a decision 
is taken in order to resolve a conflict that may arise as a result of competing ideals (Grauhan 
and Strubelt, 1971). Administrative choice refers to the actions taken by a collective structure, 
the decisions taken whether relating to conflict or anything else, if taken by a collective of office 
bearers constitutes administrative choice. Social choice is another aspect of political choice that 
is comprised on the basis of conflict, social choice refers to the procedure of conflict, and its 
range is extensive from what can be deemed as basic problem solving procedure to solving 
global and civil warfare. All three choice actions therefore all encompass political choice. An 
indicator of the difference between choice and rationality is that within its scope, political 
rationality “is always embodied in institutions and strategies” that articulate with one another 
in historically contingent complexes that may be effective, problematic, or both (Foucault, 
1988:161).   
Rationality is more likely to influence choice. It is the action or set of actions that are motivated 
by aspirations or incentives of power that are part and parcel of dominance of political office. In 
essence political rationality can be best understood as the logic of political practice. Political 
rationality transcends beyond the institutions and ideas espoused by leaders but speak to a 
greater issue of the surrounding circumstances that influence these ideas and institutions, the 
circumstances that give rise to a certain type of thinking and decision making (Wilder, 2003). 
Political rationality is in this sense understood to be a product of the circumstances in which it 
develops, in the instance of a war economy for example, there are a number of parties that 
stand to gain from conflict. The adversaries share a common interest and the interest, in this 
instance being financial will drive the process of rationality from outside the dimension of 
legitimate political institutions and individual assumptions.  
Rationality of means and ends is an aspect of rationality that entails more of a philosophical 
stance as it denotes that all human activity that is goal orientated is always inclined towards a 
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rational or irrational stance, consequently the extent to which a political goal can be deemed 
correct or incorrect is directly proportional to how rational said goal is (Conn, Meltz and Press, 
1973). Accordingly, then, rationality of means and ends though important is narrow in its 
conceptualization, and as a definition gives a superficial or rather surface perspective of the 
rationality process by denoting that goal orientation equates rationality. What of behaviour 
that is not goal orientated? Is that behaviour and the actors that display it less rational? This is 
where the language and conceptualization of rationality becomes critical. The rationality 
assumption places emphasis on the purposive nature of behaviour, rather than referring to 
goals and goal orientation this concept of rationality highlights the alternatives chosen by 
political actors regardless of goal orientation. In this sense all action stands to be measured 
within the scope of political rationality (Conn et al, 1973). It is important to note and 
acknowledge at this juncture that political rationality does not operate in a bubble. That is to 
say that individual behaviour depicting political rationality that’s been the focus of the 
discussion up to this stage operates within an environment, to be specific, a strategic 
environment. According to his definition of rationality in the political sense, it cannot be 
divorced from the surrounding environment and social situations in which the actors exercising 
said rationality find themselves in. Therefore actors will make decisions based on reward status. 
The greater the reward for choosing a particular alternative the greater the likelihood of that 
being the chosen path (Riker, 1962). Looking at the instance of political rationality means that 
this incentive or reward basis trumps other political aspirations, even goal orientation decisions 
become obsolete in the pursuit of “larger payoffs” (Riker, 1962:232). Riker’s analysis of political 
rationality therefore brings in the surrounding environment as an important determinant in this 
process (Riker, 1962).  
I will relate this to the instance of indirect rule in Africa, if this concept is applied to the role that 
customary chiefs played in the subjugation of African people it becomes evident that the larger 
payoff theorem operating within a larger context of political manoeuvring is a possibility. The 
chiefs were given power by the colonial powers to the extent that they used it to maintain 
customary law and order in their respective villages, for the chiefs the larger payoff was firstly 
being absolved from the harsh treatment inflicted on ordinary Africans who did not hold any 
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rank in the colonial structure. Secondly the chiefs lived more comfortable and privileged lives as 
compared to their subjects by virtue of the colonial payoffs, accordingly then these larger 
payoffs within the harsh nature of the colonial structure drive the actions of these chiefs even if 
it was at the expense of their people (Geschiere, 1993). This is but one example of larger 
payoffs occurring within a broader political aspect that substantiates Riker’s analysis of political 
rationality.  
Paramount to the rationality discourse is the circumstance of survival, the need to exist goes 
beyond natural instincts, although this may very well be the starting point, the desire to exist is 
found in all avenues of human interaction. In this regard, “it is not by chance that even the 
proponents of a procedural concept of rationality give as the only material standard of 
appraisal, the survival quality” (Grauhan and Strubelt, 1971: 254). In as much as survival is the 
standard, the capacity to self-annihilate is completely possible as it is in nature with the 
possibility towards suicide. Acknowledging that rationality exists within these complexities 
enhances the understanding that the interplay between choice and rationality is a multi 
dimensional scope that allows for a range of possibilities and interpretations. The above-
mentioned explanations are broad interpretations of what political rationality entails and is 
practically observed.   
2.2 Political rationality in postcolonial African states 
The discourse surrounding the political process in the African post colony places as much 
emphasis if not more on the role played by the newly independent governments. The 
institutions, ideas and decisions are underwritten by a particular discourse, which is referred to 
as rationality. Taking into cognisance all that has been covered thus far in the discussion 
pertaining to what political rationality entails and the various forms by which it is defined, this 
particular section will display political rationality as it has taken place in postcolonial African 
states.  
African states are without a doubt not homogeneous. The political, economic and 
administrative frameworks are all different in their characterisation, and scholars and theorists 
will therefore assess identifiable similar patterns and phenomena in order to firstly diagnose 
17 
 
what causes certain unfavourable circumstances and secondly attempt to formulate viable 
solutions, in this case it will be to assess what peculiar circumstances would lead to atrocity and 
violence. The phenomena which will be assessed occur within the context of independence and 
self-determination, this context is a condition of postcolonial Africa and thus signifies a certain 
expectation from governments in relation to their social, political and economic circumstances. 
It is at this point that the nature of rationality seeks to dispel the expectation that self-
determination will be enough to serve as an indicator for considerable rationality more so if it is 
detached from the historical context from which it stems from (Grauhan and Strubelt, 1971). 
The contention that self-determination as an instinctive determinant of accountability denotes 
an impaired conceptualization of the nature of rationality and how it functions. It is important 
to remain cognisant of the reality that “self-determination may lead to pathological choices 
because self-destruction may be chosen in an act of free self-determination, thus self-
determination as a formal principle that still requires a material criterion of rationality” 
(Grauhan and Strubelt, 1971: 255). 
An example of phenomena and patterns causing unfavourable circumstances that may speak to 
the self-destructive nature of postcolonial governing structures is that of clientalism and 
patronage. These factors have become synonymous with numerous African states since 
independence, and what is most pertinent to this report is analysing how they are corollaries of 
political rationality. Rationality that denotes a means to an end and the patron client 
relationship gained prominence at the dawn of independence as this alliance became a pivotal 
stratagem in the survival of governments (Berman, 1974). The alliance between the patron who 
holds the power in terms of political office and access to the economy and the client who forms 
part of the citizenry and voting constituency becomes a mechanism for corruption when the 
patron uses it to maintain in their positions of power by exerting their economic and political 
clout over the client. This disproportionate alliance is rooted in the inequality of the two parties 
where the more powerful counterpart (those holding office) use their position to give benefits 
to the disenfranchised members of the community in return for the patrons continued support 
for them to hold office. 
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 The action of using patronage as a means to fulfil the ends of remaining in office has been so 
detrimental to state apparatus that it calls into question the rational validity of this process, 
that is to say if political rationality was a mechanism by which political leaders simply conveyed 
the best interests of those over whom they govern then the client-patron relationship could be 
deemed as irrational, that however is not the case. As the discussion has demonstrated, 
political rationality is a concept that is far more complex than that and according to its 
parameters, the client-patron relation falls squarely within this definition. It is a means to an 
end. The detrimental aspect of this correlation according to Berman is that “personalism, 
affectivity and the pursuit of individual interests are paramount in patron-client relations, 
leaving no room for impersonal, universalistic and collective goals or modes of action” 
(1974:13). Perhaps a more detrimental consequence of this relationship is its maintenance of 
inequality and the disenfranchisement of the lower strata of society as the asymmetrical nature 
of the relationship entails that there is an indigent party that is on the receiving end. This does 
not serve the socio-economic status of a country; as a matter of fact it often worsens it.The 
negative impact of this relationship can be observed in developing countries where economies 
are kept in a fragile state by those inefficient leaders who use patron client relations to ensure 
that they are not voted out of power and in turn continue with pillaging their states funds.  
Political rationality as mandated by larger payoffs can be recognised in the propensity for 
African states since independence to have a tendency towards rent seeking practices in so far 
as this form of rationality is rooted in an individual’s “surrounding environment” (Riker, 
1962:230). Rent seeking is not a phenomenon that is unique to postcolonial Africa; globally it 
has been used as an effective method to influence the functioning of state machinery. In Africa, 
however, the functioning of newly independent regimes came to be synonymous with this type 
of practice, as with clientalism and patronage, rent seeking came to be a norm rather than the 
exception. At this juncture it is important to note the kind of conditions that are optimum to 
the rise of rent seeking tendencies; it is most likely to be a norm “when citizens do not view the 
state as legitimate or deserving of respect” (Coolidge and Ackerman, 1995:3). With the turn of 
the century many newly independent African states promises of democracy and freedom were 
unfulfilled, as one by one states became one-party states that threatened the freedoms and 
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prosperity of their people. With the stability of the state apparatus being constantly called into 
question, the African post colony plagued by socioeconomic and political challenges produced 
conditions that were optimum to rent seeking (Coolidge and Ackerman, 1995).  
The process of rent seeking is when citizens identify an opportunity to occupy the government 
and use its redistributive influence in order to make themselves wealthy by banding together as 
a collective that will have more power to impact on distributional outcomes. In the instance 
that resources are disbursed to influence these outcomes then that is when rent seeking occurs 
(Mbaku, 1998). Rent seeking is not necessarily corruption although it can easily be deemed a 
corrupt activity that is generally associated with developing countries. In the case of African 
states specifically rent seeking is characterized by underwriting of the campaigns of legislators, 
bribery, lobbying, and political violence (Mbaku, 1998). For the purposes of this discussion the 
focus will be orientated towards political violence and how it operates as a function of rent 
seeking in states wrought with atrocities and unrest. The use of violence as a method of rent 
seeking speaks to the rationality of using resources to maintain a powerful grip on state 
machinery. In this way those in power control who have access to the revenues generated by 
these resources and in which direction and the specific activities that these revenues fund. In 
the face of the threat of an insurrection or in the instance of a coup, rent seeking becomes 
pivotal in the states power play (Mbaku and Paul, 1989). In terms of rationality, rent seeking 
can be seen as an effectual strategy to ensure that the government of the day firmly controls all 
economic activity, leaving very little or no room for opportunism and the challenging of 
authority. By controlling the rents, the state controls their constituencies and in the volatile 
nature of the postcolonial state such a mechanism used to guarantee power becomes an 
invaluable asset. That being said, it must be highlighted that rent seeking invariably cripples the 
economy and to this end cannot be regarded as sound economic practice, but just as with the 
previously mentioned phenomenon of patronage, the activity of rent seeking contributes to 
this methodology by the virtue of it being a an expression of political rationality. 
The most common form of political rationality stems from instances of conflict which are the 
main focus of this project. Apart from rent seeking and patronage, governments have been 
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known to use outright violence and various measures that will in some way lead to dissention 
amongst their citizens and constituencies in order to cement their positions of power 
(Ahluwalia, 2001). The use of militia and mercenaries is synonymous with postcolonial 
governments that have become totalitarian in nature. This is not always in response to 
insurrections but is something that can occur without an apparent provocation. As will be 
illustrated in relation to the case of the Darfur region in Sudan, it is not uncommon for a 
government to institute violence against its citizens as a form of a politically rationalized 
process. This process poses a threat to legitimacy as it does not operate in the realm of formal, 
codified and policy-laden structure (Ahluwalia, 2001), it instead relies on the use of seemingly 
unconventional means in order to entrench the agenda that the state is in control, whether 
conventional or not that implies a position of rationality. In the absence of sufficient 
institutionalization into its postcolonial existence, the state directs its efforts to maintaining 
order in spite of arising factionalism that is a consequence of weak or illusive citizenship that is 
supposed to unite individuals to the state.  
State engineered conflicts, which are advanced at the expense of the citizens benefits the 
individual interests of those in governing structures. In a state where there is no sense of 
citizenship this is therefore a rational process of strategizing. Conflict is used to maintain a 
monopoly of power over the citizenry against the various warring factions (Jinadu, 2007) but 
this must take into consideration the aspect of beneficial payoffs. It has often been taken for 
granted that the political circumstances in postcolonial Africa are as a result of the general 
underdevelopment of the continent, which culminates in the overall irrationality of the political 
system. This however is an assumption that arises from not critically analysing the concept of 
rationality and how its basic tenets can be applied to all circumstances even those that depict 
anarchy. Political rationality when understood from a survival perspective can be identified in 
all action taken by the state inclusive of destructive measures that may be taken by said state 
against its own citizens (Ahluwalia, 2001).  
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2.3 The silent role of colonial rule in postcolonial political rationality 
As it has been elucidated in the preceding discourse earlier in this chapter, the nature of 
rationality is attributed to a conscious thought process undertaken with an expected possible 
outcome and specified gains. Among the various definitions of political rationality, the one that 
I will elaborate on and that will supplement this chapter’s argument that focuses on the role 
played by colonialism is the theory of rational strategy. The construct of this definition seeks to 
address a fundamental aspect of the relationship between the basic characteristics of colonial 
rule and the current crisis of the postcolonial African state. This definition as delineated by 
Conn et al can be applied to explain at length the adverse nature of colonial power on the post 
colony.  
The previous section has outlined how political rationality has been displayed in a number of 
phenomena that have been characteristic of the postcolonial African state. This section will 
tend to the peripheral circumstance of colonial rule and how it has influenced political 
rationality; it will outline the political rationality process in the distinctive legacies of colonialism 
that have plagued the continent since decolonisation. The legacies and more importantly the 
rationality influencing those legacies are all undergirded by colonial rule. The above section 
covered the factors of patronage and clientalism and how they impact political and economic 
structures of the state, the rationality argument posits that the use of patronage by 
postcolonial governments can be seen as a remnant of colonial rulers’ use of chiefs in their 
indirect rule structure to strengthen their domination over the colonised. The patron client 
relationship embodied in the politics of patronage that is witnessed in the post colony is an 
inheritance with the patron prior to independence being the colonial power and the client 
being the chiefs (Khan, 1996). It was in the colonial powers best interest that they incentivise 
the chiefs in order to maintain their stronghold over the colony, the intricacies of agency on the 
side of the chiefs is an occurrence that has come to manifest itself through the contemporary 
phenomenon of political rationality. It is with an end goal, an economic and political strategy 
that the political rationality of the colonizers was consolidated, in the same way that the then 
client is now the patron, implementing the same rationality along a similar circumstance. 
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There is a theory advanced by scholars such as Berman that African politics are by nature 
“personalistic materialistic and opportunistic” (Berman, 1998: 305). While this may indeed be 
the case, it is inadequate to analyse this conduct outside of the realm of existing political 
rationality and how it is influenced by prior colonial rule. If rationality and in particular political 
rationality is premised on the cognitive competency to amalgamate and conform to cultural 
and developmental contents to achieve a preferential outcome then it is the contents of 
colonial society that we should be concerned with (Boboyorov, 2013). The colonial structure did 
not instantaneously fall away when the European powers left the continent. The tenets of 
society that defined the colonial era were innately embedded in the framework of the emerging 
independent state. The contents of this preceding state such as the importance of chiefs, the 
use of race identity to divide ethnic groups, organizing the state along gatekeeper lines and the 
use of violence being the most identifiable colonial inclinations is the basis upon which the 
subsequent independent state is based on.  
The role of previously mentioned chiefs and traditional men speaks to a much broader aspect 
of indirect rule, a circumstance whereby the chiefs are exercising rationality that is indicative of 
their quest for survival as well as the quest for political power. During colonial rule, chiefs were 
operating within the parameters of colonial power; these parameters provide the 
developmental contents within which society comes about (Geschiere, 1993). The system of 
indirect rule is the perpetual contents within which the post colony continues to operate in, 
even after it has officially ceased to be a system that governments employ in their rule (apart 
from the customary and traditional laws). Indirect rule in the form of patron client interaction 
as a learned and transferred tendency continues to exist and continues to dictate to 
postcolonial governments the rules of political engagement.  
The pervasive nature of rent seeking in the post colony is another politically rational action that 
is steeped in the influence of colonial rule. More so than patronage, rent seeking is a 
corresponding action of what the colonial power exercised in terms of aim, objectives and 
expected outcomes. Essentially since the process of assigning property rights can lead to rent 
seeking, which usually occurs when the state controls property rights or "can easily assign and 
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transfer rights that are supposedly in private hands" (Mbaku, 1991: 3), then it stands to reason 
that the colonial project can be said to have been a rent seeking exercise in its entirety: the 
monopolization of property rights and resources by the minority European powers is the model 
upon which current political rationality that influences contemporary rent seeking practices is 
based on.  
The premise of rent seeking is to the benefit of the few and the detriment of the many, in the 
post colony it is the economy that suffers (Mbaku, 1991). During the colonial period the 
economy of the colonised state also suffered but the metropolitan economy benefited from 
this exploitation. Rent seeking is heightened in the absence of colonial rule for the reasons that 
it is the independent government that is engineering the country’s economic demise. The 
political playing field indicates that this is a process of political rationality on the side of the 
governing structure, a rational choice that is made by a party holding office in order to maintain 
that position. It is imperative to elucidate that “the cornerstone of collective rationality, 
including habitus, norms, and values distinguish institutions from other categories of agency 
such as interests, motivations and strategies. These collective categories are the taken for 
granted elements of action, which reproduce social structure and explain how and why 
strategically orientated agents chronically reproduce and acquiesce to a social structure which 
may not be in their interests” (Boboyorov, 2013:41). In essence there are elements in the 
current social structure that are simulations of the prior epoch, in this instance the elements of 
found in the colonial era are reproduced in the post colony. 
The interrelation between political rationality and colonialism therefore posits that the 
rationality process in the scope of politics in the post colony is not free from colonial influence. 
The choices made and the ensuing consequences indicate influence in the manner that 
behaviour is adapted as opposed to conditioned. The nature and sophistication of colonial rule 
in Africa denotes that it will be characteristically transmitted into the postcolonial spaces of 
political, social and economic influence. 
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Chapter 3: The political legacies of colonial rule in postcolonial African states 
 
The legacies of colonialism refer to the myriad of consequences that this form of rule had on 
the African continent. In order to establish a concise analysis into these consequences, the 
legacies are assessed in accordance to the economic, political and social impact that they have 
on the postcolonial state. Though these consequences may be interrelated, respectively they 
have very distinct characteristics that merit an individual analysis of each and to this end the 
following chapter will focus specifically on the political legacies of colonial rule. In order to 
interpret the inherited governance institutions that have influenced the postcolonial Sudanese 
state it is of consequence to focus on the broader political legacies of colonial rule on the 
continent as a whole. 
By framing the narrative of how political legacies of colonial rule influence Africa in a broad 
perspective, we are better able to understand how the politics of Sudan fit into this framework 
as well as how they may be different. This chapter seeks to contribute to literature that 
considers the theory of political legacies to explain postcolonial violence that is not as a result 
of a revolution or that is related to commerce and economic strife. In addition to evaluating 
political legacies, the report seeks to assess the role of political rationality as it is characterised 
by the postcolonial government, in order to do so it is imperative that the context in which the 
rationality is characterised be thoroughly comprehended.  
This chapter is organised into four sections. In the first section I explore how European powers 
characterised their rule over the continent. This section is important since it establishes the 
framework for the sections that are to follow by elucidating how politics and governance were 
characterized during colonial times and therefore providing the context out of which the 
legacies of this rule will emerge. In section two the report will explicate the ways in which 
political legacies of colonial rule have come to be conceptualized in the postcolonial space by 
assessing the interrelated factors of autocracy and violence that arise from the remnants of 
colonization. The inclusion of this section is crucial for the reason that the political legacies 
described transpire in the case of Sudan.  
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In the third section I will analyse the rise of nationalism and how it was envisioned as a 
mechanism to unite Africans and bring about unity among the various ethnicities in the 
respective states. This argument is important to the greater theme of this chapter in that it 
demonstrates how this process was affected by the colonial shadow of segregation, which 
loomed over the attempts by independent states at consolidating a unified political trajectory. 
This shadow looms over the Sudanese state and has been particularly influential in the political 
space that has contributed to the atrocities and turmoil that have engulfed the country post 
independence. In the fourth and final section I will be evaluating the instance of violence in the 
post colony as a significant part of the political legacies of colonialism. This section also seeks to 
determine how decolonization itself was a compelling influence on this violence. This section is 
fundamental to the rest of the report because of its focus on the violence aspect of 
independence which is the other great theme of the report’s discourse.  
3. 1 European rule across Africa  
For most African countries, colonization spanned just under a century. The years between 1885 
and 1960 marked officially by the Berlin Conference of 1885. Some countries gained 
independence just before 1960 whilst others decolonised a short time after this date (Griffiths, 
1995). Despite the nuances the 75-year period cumulatively encapsulates the duration of 
colonial rule in Africa. The continent was divided between seven European countries; Belgium, 
Spain, Italy, Britain, France, Germany and Portugal (the number was reduced to four with the 
absence of Germany after the First World War) these European nations exercised domination 
over their colonies with methods that were relatively similar and will now be elaborated.  
A general trait of colonial rule was the use of indirect rule to subjugate African populations and 
provide a manageable administrative purpose. This system of rule was predominantly 
fashioned but not limited to the British colonizers. It relied heavily on the use of chiefs and 
traditional men as they represented authority in the villages (Mamdani, 1996). The system of 
indirect rule relied on already established institutions, which were reinforced to perform as 
integral components of local and colonial government. This system was beneficial to the 
colonial state as it entrenched European hegemony without having to use extensive amounts of 
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resources or taking over responsibility for managing the local affairs of their subjects. The chiefs 
and traditional men could not act outside of the supervision of the colonial power and 
accordingly the mandate and instruction came from the colonizer (Young, 1994). This system 
was aptly described by Governor Clifford of Nigeria, when he states “The Political Officer should 
be the Whisper behind the throne, but never for an instant the throne itself” (Young, 1994: 
149). So crucial was the ‘throne’ to the survival of the colony that even in the instances that 
there was no chief in a village, the colonial administration would appoint one. Chiefs were in 
charge of collecting taxes, choosing military recruits and instituting forced labour for the 
colonial power. By virtue of customary law as stipulated by the colonizer, chiefs had the power 
to adjudicate in all civil cases that occurred between the indigenous people, to arrest and issue 
fines to anyone who transgressed against the abovementioned instructions of the colonial 
power. The power given to chiefs by the colonizers was all encompassing, according to 
Mamdani; the role of the chief embodied the functions of “petty legislator, administrator, judge 
and policeman all in one man” (1996: 54).  The colonial power being the crown or the throne in 
encompassed the direct rule component and was concerned with the economic aspect of their 
presence in the colony as well as the civilizing mission. Accordingly then, the extraction of 
resources to be used by the crown, oversight of the chiefs indirect rule and advancing 
Christianity and Christian values through mission schools in place cultural values, tradition and 
rituals which were deemed barbaric was the function of direct rule on the continent. 
Subordinates had no avenue to express their grievances should they be disgruntled by any 
actions taken by the chief against them. Speaking ill of the chief about any of his actions was an 
ineffable act; the superior colonial power with the interests of using the chiefs to impose 
customary law and maintain order did not create or foster channels where the chiefs’ powers 
could be kept in check, a system of what Mamdani refers to as “decentralized despotism” 
epitomised the nature of indirect rule (Mamdani, 1996: 59).  
The use of chiefs was also a cost effective mechanism that meant that colonial officers could be 
kept at a minimum. Colonies were maintained by taxes forcibly imposed on the colonised and 
collected by the chiefs on behalf of the colonial power. At any given time there were a handful 
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of colonial officers overseeing thousands of Africans, this system ensured that the colonial 
powers could take what they needed from their respective colonies without the political 
responsibility of ensuring the political wellbeing of said colony. The maintenance of order was 
the colonizers primary concern; their responsibility towards the colonised population did not 
extend beyond the maintaining of order, which was in itself to the benefit of the colonial power 
(Griffiths, 1996). In the British colonies in particular, law and order was ensuring that all entities 
and actions that threatened the system of colonial rule in that colony would be effectively 
quelled. In countries such as Kenya and South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) which were prone to 
unrests, more police and military personnel were deployed by the British in order to maintain a 
firm grip and move swiftly against any arising rebellions. As Killingray notes, “In Southern 
Rhodesia you might say that every inch of the territory is policed, you have regular patrols” (1986: 
415).  
Colonial states were inconsistently administered, the difference in administration is indicative 
of the colonizer’s intentions to extract resources and not be liable for the colony’s political 
wellbeing; this is embodied in the different ways way administration was carried out in British 
and French colonies in particular.  Resource rich areas received greater administrative attention 
as opposed to areas that lacked resources, this in turn meant that the level of development also 
differed; the resource poor areas would remain practically undeveloped whereas the resource 
rich areas would, in conjunction with the greater administrative presence also have extensive 
infrastructural development (Cooper, 2002). An example of this is the state of development in 
Angola; the areas close to the oilfields have been substantially developed: tarred roads, 
hospitals and schools have been constructed to ensure the efficiency of oil extraction and 
refinement. This has not been the case for arears that are established quite a distance from the 
oilfields, the development for these areas has been largely neglected and the government that 
took power after independence did not do much to improve this situation (Soares de Oliviera, 
2011).  This above-mentioned characterization of indirect rule has implications for the post 
colony, as the report will further elaborate. Apart from indirect rule the colonial system relied 
on the use of violence and coercion to varying degrees in order to entrench dominance, 
incidentally the use of coercion relied on framework of indirect rule.  
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A famous painting, the Colonie belge could be found in the homes of many Congolese families 
during the years of Joseph Mobutu’s reign. This painting depicts the might and the cruelty of 
the colonial system. There is an African soldier with a whip in his hand standing over a colonial 
subject who is lying with his stomach on the ground with his hands clasped together and a look 
of dread across his face as he is waiting for the whip to come down onto his body. Behind the 
African soldier “the source of power and authority in the colonial state, the Belgian 
administrator, savours his pipe with the calm self- assurance of total command over the 
situation” (Young and Turner, 1985: 3).  This painting is symbolic of the use of violence by the 
colonizer to enforce its hegemony and the stance of the colonial administrator. In particular, his 
positioning behind the African soldier who issuing out the punishment is a personification of 
the “whisper behind the throne” symptom of indirect rule which has been mentioned 
previously.  
Coercion and violence were indispensable tools in the conquest of African territories, as a 
contingency plan to ensure their desired outcomes in the instance that the resolutions of the 
Berlin conference are met with resistance by the territories they sought to conquer; European 
powers understood that military force would be the integral to their success (Young, 1994). The 
force used to crush resistance during the conquest would be transferred to the period of 
colonial rule that was to designate Africa for a number of years. As depicted in the Colonie 
belge painting local security forces manned by Africans were a prominent feature in the 
colonies, outside of maintaining order, their presence and use of corporal punishment against 
anyone who opposed the work or working conditions was as necessary for the extractive 
process: the forced labour carried out by Africans in a variety of industries such as farms, 
mining and building of infrastructure that would foster the processing of the minerals in 
Europe-ports, harbours, railways were built by Africans to ship the extracted resources out of 
the continent to Europe (Young, 1994).   
The colonizers exhibited an inherent conviction that Europeans were far more civilized and 
advanced than the savage Africans which they came to conquer, and in order to supplement 
their force Africans were made to believe that the tyranny of the colonizers was to their benefit 
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(Young, 1994). Racial inferiority permeated much of African society during the colonial years; at 
every turn the Africans were reminded of their intrinsic inferiority in relation to their colonial 
masters. The years of European rule were the years of a cultural onslaught on African 
traditions, the adjustment and to a larger extent loss of traditions and culture pervaded this 
time period. The loss of political control and violence of European hegemony was now 
accompanied by the destruction of established cultural norms (Vansina, 1990).  
The prohibition of diviners and spiritual mediums, clamping down on public rituals and dances 
that Africans believed connected them to the spirit world and even the barring of healing rituals 
were some of the actions implemented by the colonial powers that in time drove the Africans 
further away from their identity. The colonial presence and its prohibition had a greater 
consequence than the disruption of African cultures. Hostility developed between the old and 
young people as well as between the people in the rural and the burgeoning urban areas 
(Vansina, 1990). The young and those in urban areas displayed a greater willingness to let go of 
the ways of old and subscribe to the colonial order whereas the opposite was true of the older 
generation and those in rural areas. This hostility was a common feature in how people 
interacted with each other, bereft of a common purpose and commitment to culture, Africans 
sought to assimilate to a new synthesis, a new synthesis, which according to Vansina “could not 
be achieved as long as freedom of action was denied to them” (1990: 247). The struggle for 
identity was thus a prominent feature during the colonial period, a struggle whose legacy 
continues to affect the ambit of political and social institutions in the postcolonial space, a 
dimension that the following section will explore.   
3. 2 Colonial political legacies emerging in the postcolonial space   
Africa after decolonization has experienced a great deal of strife: from civil wars and rising 
insurgencies, to genocide and escalating mortality rates. The large-scale troubles that have 
plagued the continent are collectively referred to as the postcolonial crisis. In accounting for 
the cause of the crisis, there prevails an inclination towards attributing these troubles to the 
immediate deficiency of state apparatus, a tendency to intimate that Africa’s host of 
postcolonial challenges are the result of the post colony. This report asserts that this school of 
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thought omits the important historical effect that colonial rule has and in this section will assess 
how political legacies of colonialism are manifested in the postcolonial space.  
A political legacy of colonialism that continues to present challenges to nation states is the lack 
of democratic rule.  Postcolonial Africa has been dominated by one party states and leaders 
that use any means necessary to ensure that they stay in office. This was exemplified by the 
fact that at the end of 1980, roughly 20 years into independence, not one of the new African 
heads of state had allowed himself to be voted out office. Any opposition and dissenting views 
expressed by the populace would be routinely crushed by despots who employed the services 
of secret police and overzealous supporters to inform them of the movements and 
whereabouts of dissenters. The use of execution, imprisonment and flogging against the 
perceived ‘enemies of the state’ was common practice (Meredith, 2011).  
The opposition to popular participation in the politics of the state is characteristic of the state 
structures consolidated after colonization. African leaders have ruthlessly displayed their 
dominance over the populations they may have initially pledged to serve. Once in power, 
leaders such as Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Idi Amin and Joseph Mobutu (to name a few) soon turned 
into tyrants, displaying acts of violence against their respective populace, thereby drifting 
further afield from democratization (Meredith, 2011). These are not isolated cases. Their 
occurrence is symptomatic of a greater anti-democratic disposition, of the need to control all 
aspects of the state from a central position, an occurrence that is characteristic of the colonial 
method of rule.   
The political climate during colonization was suffused by centralization of leadership. In the first 
instance all power was centralized in the hands of the European nations that seized and 
retained colonies without the involvement, consent or participation of those that they were 
colonizing. The parameters of customary law as an integral constituent of indirect rule meant 
that all power was concentrated into the hands of the chief. This further excluded the people 
from involvement in the decision making process, this decentralized despotism as Mamdani 
refers to it seems to have been replaced by ‘centralized despotism’ where the centralized 
power rendered to chiefs was now shifted into the hands of presidents and statesmen, the 
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holders of power in postcolonial African states may have changed but the nature of power 
dynamics did not (Mamdani, 1996).  
At this juncture, it is perhaps necessary to briefly explicate the nature of pre-colonial African 
society in order to grasp the extent to which colonialism was a disruption to the political nature 
of traditional African society. What is today understood to be democracy was widely practiced 
in precolonial African villages, districts, kingdoms and empires, the leaders of these entities 
often ruled with the cooperation of councillors? Villages were governed through the active 
collaboration of numerous contingencies for instance in the Akan tribe in the region of what is 
today known as Ghana there existed a central government where executive power was divided 
amongst stakeholders, the equivalent of the current separation of powers that is the case in 
most democratic states. The reason for this separation was to regulate this executive power 
through collective participation (Davidson, 1992).  
Another example is that of the Lozi tribe in Zambia where the political, economic and even 
social structure was based on collective cooperation, although there was a chief the village 
structure was organized in a way that required the participation of everyone in the village. 
From the pooling of resources to decision making, the chiefs power and responsibility was that 
of facilitating this process of involvement and with regards to decision making relied on the 
recommendations of those in his council (Ndulo, 1998).  With the inception of colonization on 
the continent and the subsequent structure of indirect rule enforced by the colonizers, this 
democratic system of governance fell away, to be replaced by customary law and the 
concentration of power in the hands of the chief.  
In the postcolonial space, customary law has been redefined, the new mandate of revolution 
and development being used as justifications to legitimate what was and continue to be 
essentially anti-democratic practices by newly independent governments (Mamdani, 1996). 
Elitism in the form of patronage was integral to anti-democratic undertaking by autocratic 
states.  
Politics has consistently been run by elites in the post colony. Those in proximity to power exert 
their influence over entire structures where those in leadership feel deeply indebted to these 
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outside of government. The Congo is one such state where the effects of patronage were most 
evident. In the years following independence, state apparatus and resources were used as 
rewards to those that supported the incumbent government at the time. Ministerial positions 
were given, as rewards on the basis of ethnicity and most ministries were comprised of 
members of a single ethnicity that which the party leadership was affiliated to or alternatively 
felt indebted to. In order to maintain support party leaders appeased their constituencies 
through the means of patronage and outside of ministerial positions benefits and access to 
resources were openly given to members of the public (Young and Turner, 1985).  
Although this system of patronage tended to decline once Mobutu’s personalization of politics 
was solidified it was not completely eradicated and continued to permeate primarily through 
the business sector. During Mobutu’s stay in office, his interactions with the leaders of business 
and enterprise had deep links to policies that promote patronage. Prominent political figures in 
his regime were given, as a reward of their support to him, power to facilitate administrative 
processes at government level for businesses in order for them to receive the authorization 
they require in return for government access to the funds generated by said business (Young 
and Turner, 1985).  
The nature of patronage links is complex and it is not often clear whom this arrangement 
benefits. There is the theory proposed by Jean-Francois Bayart that advances this alternative 
perspective on the system of patronage and those it benefits. He posits that that true power 
does not rest in the hands of those holding office but that power resides within the social 
networks surrounding those in power (Bayart, 1993).  Those who have the means and access to 
resources have the obligation to provide for those that do not and in this sense the leaders of 
African states are indebted to their constituents, to this end patronage is a way of giving back 
to the social networks that essentially provide the support base for the government (Bayart, 
1993).  Furthermore this argument posits that the process of postcolonial patronage in Africa is 
an inherently African trait that cannot be recognized in nations outside of the continent as it 
emerges from the way in which African people as a whole are socialized.  
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This interpretation addresses a seminal perspective regarding agency in patronage links but is 
lacking in that it omits some important factors, which cannot be negated when addressing the 
issue of patronage in African states. The legacy of colonialism in Africa has had an impact on the 
pervasive patronage systems that emerged in the postcolonial space, the local “big men” who 
are instrumental in this system are a continuity of the construct of chieftaincy during colonial 
rule. 
3. 3 The rise of African nationalism and its relation to political legacies of colonial rule 
The end of colonial rule in Africa presented an opportunity for newly independent states to 
redefine their identity and purpose from being colonies of European powers to being sovereign 
nation states. Nationalism emerged as the future purpose for all the newly independent states. 
The nationalist agenda emerged to facilitate the transitioning of African states from their pre-
colonial kingdoms, villages and districts that were made up of varying ethnic groups that were 
thrust together under colonial rule to having to adapt as independent states after 
decolonization. This process would mean that the newly independent African states had a 
mammoth task ahead of them.  
Releasing Africa from the shackles of colonial rule was the great undertaking that united people 
of different ethnicities in their respective states and even united the then colonies with each 
other. With the colonizer gone, nation building would be the inevitable next step and the 
concept of African nationalism began to take shape. The difference however and perhaps a 
great source of the challenges to nation building that emerged during this time was that in 
Africa unlike in China or India, nationalism arose out of unity against the colonial presence. 
Outside of anticolonial nationalism, Africans did not have a historical unified identity; according 
to Hodgkin “there has been no single comprehensive civilisation, no common background of 
written culture, to which African nationalists could refer" (1957:71). The people were rightfully 
so still tied to their various ethnic groups that they occupied space with under colonial 
domination. African nationalism did not have a historical reference point and was an entirely 
novel concept that the new governments undertook with what was to be great difficulty 
(Hodgkin, 1957).  
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Nationalism is fostered within the parameters of a nation state. There can be no nationalism 
without a nation. African conceptualizations of the nation state derive from a European model, 
with African heads of state seeking to construct their states based on this model (Davidson, 
1992). Whereas patronage and undemocratic practices are perceived as political legacies of 
colonialism that have had had a negative impact on postcolonial Africa, the topic of nationalism 
as a legacy and the extent to which it has advantaged or disadvantaged independent states is a 
contentious matter.  
In accepting that the components nationalism: national identity, nation and even the concept 
of a nation state are all western constructs what implications did this have for the post 
colonies? In the first instance, this meant that unity against colonial rule, as the foundation for 
this nation-building endeavour would no longer be sufficient once the colonizers had left the 
continent. The different ethnicities and former tribes that reside alongside would have to come 
together under a vision and interests that were common to them and it would be the 
responsibility of the new governing structure to facilitate this process within the above 
mentioned inherited western parameters (Coleman, 1954).  
The move towards nationalism that emerged at the moment of decolonization entailed a 
composition between the western concepts of nationhood and traditional concepts familiar to 
various African societies. The result thereof, which is referred to as African nationalism, is a 
model which is not solely based on ancient African traditions but is also not entirely a 
representation of western nationalism, it straddles, at times rather clumsily these two 
circumstances (Coleman, 1954). In the wake of decolonization the march towards nationalism 
appeared to be the instance that would usher in a new and unprecedented era of prosperity for 
the respective states. Currencies were changed, anthems were composed, flags were designed 
and country names were changed, all of it signalling the unity and commitment to 
independence of these new nations (Meredith, 2011).  
Across the economic, social and political spheres, Africa as a whole was on the rise, prices were 
quite high for commodities that came out of African states such as cocoa, coffee and minerals 
like copper. On the whole economic growth for most countries was high and public debt was 
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low, this coincided with the resurgence of pride in African culture. Novelists, playwrights and 
musicians were in their element; across the continent a celebration of Africa’s rich traditions 
through the arts was on the rise. With respects to political processes, the new regimes initially 
sought to build their states upon western democratic principles, elections and multi-party 
systems were the preferred methods envisaged to bring about a bright political future. 
Despite this fervour, Africa’s nationalism project was beset with challenges signalled by the 
unrest that gripped a number of states a short while into the postcolonial period. In particular 
the respective political crises proved to be the crux of the subsequent troubles that states soon 
came to face, one after the other nation states fell into patterns of authoritarian rule and one 
party states began to take shape (Meredith, 2011). In the case of Sudan, the country’s 
geographic positioning and vast landscape in addition to the ethnic and religious disparities of 
the Sudanese would prove to be the greatest challenge to nationalism.  The incoming 
postcolonial state would have to “straddle the desert belt whilst also straddling the 
Muslim/non-Muslim divide. The division not only makes national unity more difficult to 
achieve, but has actually been a contributory cause to civil war” (Griffiths, 1995: 11). The return 
to authoritarian rule was in many was a consequence of this inability to create a political sense 
of unity amongst the people who live within the borders of a given state. Governments used 
these ethnic differences to justify the centralization of power, the narrative was that too many 
parties would represent too many interests and in order to forge a common purpose and 
maintain order only one party and one leader would be necessary (Coleman, 1954). The 
nostalgia of perceived order under colonialism cannot be divorced from this type of 
consideration.  
The pursuit of African nationalism is a legacy of colonialism in the way in which it emerged as a 
response to the years of colonial rule that kept African people under subjugation, however 
unlike authoritarian rule and patronage, nationalism emerged with the goal of uniting the 
disparate ethnicities that reside within the respective colonially imposed borders. In whatever 
way nationalism was manifested within the different countries, whatever its successes and 
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failures, the intention of nationalist objectives was imperatively freedom from alien rule and a 
political, socioeconomic future that would be decided on African rather than European terms.  
3. 4 Violence in the post colony 
The discourse on political legacies would be incomplete without an analysis of the impact that 
violence has played on the continent as a component of political legacies.  The bulk of this 
report focuses on the relationship between political rationality and violent occurrences, so it is 
therefore crucial to contextualise violence as part of the legacies of the colonial age and how it 
has affected the continent since decolonization. 
The shift from the colonial to independence brought with it a number of upheavals for states 
that now faced the pressure of creating a new postcolonial reality based largely on ideology and 
an embedded nostalgia to return to the glory of the precolonial, all the while also trying to 
balance the demands of development and the pressure to reconstruct their collective realities. 
The expectations of these new governments were immense and quite often clashed with the 
visions that leaders had for their newly independent states. As Broch-Due notes “All too often, 
it has been attempts at ‘development’ and ‘modernisation’ that have led to violence and 
upheaval. It became almost common place to expect that modernising states would were 
bound to experience violent upheavals” (Broch-Due, 2005: 12).  
It must be understood that these violent upheavals and violence itself encapsulates a number 
of modalities: structural, symbolic and physical, a shift in state structure brings about all these 
modalities. Often the emergence of physical violence which is the most identifiable mode of 
violence is a catalyst for all the other forms of violent upheavals. Identity plays a significant role 
in this process since the monumental changes impact directly on the personal and political 
identities of members of the state. This fact gives insight as to why ethnicity forms the basis of 
so many of the conflicts that take place in the post colony, ethnicity is tied to identity and 
peoples identities feel threatened or challenged when there is to be a change in governance. 
Concern about representation arises from people who wondered if the incoming government 
will effectively be able to serve their interests. In the process of decolonization in Africa where 
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governments in the initial stages of independence sought to establish democratic states that 
would grant all citizens a voice, these concerns were heightened (Broch-Due, 2005).  
Although ethnicity is not the sole form in which identity is characterises, it does assume a 
significant role in the way people have historically interacted with each other. It was always 
used by colonizers to divide people long ethnic and tribal lines, the system of indirect rule 
superimposed the differences of various tribal groups to ensure the efficiency of the system 
(Broch-Due, 2005). In the post colony ethnicity and the focus thereof on it is a facet of a much 
broader range of circumstances that are complicit to its complexity and that are related to it. 
Ethnicity “is deeply embedded in other social relationships and identities formed around 
gender, generation, locality, class, religion and nationality” (Broch-Due, 2005:16).In relation to 
violence which arises out of any one of these identities, it can therefore be conceived that 
violence that is somehow informed by the umbrella of ethnicity is an outcome of a number of 
factors and needs to needs conceptualized as an intricate and methodical process.  
Violence in the post colony is consequently reactive and formative. It is a response to a 
fluctuating political landscape that has implications on the state’s economic and social 
conditions. It is also a strategic process used to advance respective agendas, influence 
outcomes, gather resources and maintain positionality. In all this, the paradox is that in the 
displacement, death and atrocity that results from violence in the post colony, there is nothing 
desultory about its occurrence. This chapter has demonstrated that the political legacies of 
colonialism are all complicit in the characterisation of this violence. The characterisation of 
European rule itself establishes the foundation upon which the challenges of nationalism and 
governance are to emerge and culminate in violent atrocities. The following chapters analyse 
the case of Sudan to delve into the practical dynamics of how this violence and atrocity 
converges with political rationality in the post colony.  
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Chapter 4: Sudan’s colonial inheritance  
 
The reality of colonialism’s adverse impact on the state in Africa is evidenced in the fact that 
even long after states are no longer the colonies of respective European powers, the colonial 
era continues to be a factor of immense influence with regards to the economic, political and 
any other circumstance of governance in contemporary African states. Although colonial 
influence may be similar amongst the various African states, the process of rule exercised by 
respective European powers affects their colonies differently. The general concept of creating 
colonies may have been same across the continent but implementation was often varied.  
Sudan is one state that has a complicated colonial history, a history, which has contributed to 
the harrowing violent atrocities that have plagued its citizens from the time independence was 
obtained and has made peace an elusive ideal. It is imperative that the nature of colonial 
conducted be comprehended in order for the colonial transfer to be conceptualized so as to 
adequately explore the subsequent patterns of unrest leading to violent atrocities.  
This chapter seeks to analyse which colonial processes by Sudan’s respective colonizers have 
influenced contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity. More specifically, the focus is how 
the country’s experience how in terms of violence can be linked to colonisation and the actions 
that were carried out during the respective eras of the Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-British 
condominium. This chapter will be divided into three sections. In section one I explore how 
Sudan was colonised, by which states at which particular times.  This section will provide an 
overview of the nature of Sudan’s various colonial epochs, detailing the complex nature of 
foreign involvement at the various points of Sudan’s colonization.  Section two explores the 
aspects of dominance and brutality and how these concepts are interrelated, how they have 
been used by the various colonizers to entrench and maintain terror amongst the colonised and 
how colonisation at its very basis is a construct of racism and racialized domination. The 
inclusion of this section is important because it bring forth the direct link between colonial time 
dominance and brutality and the contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity in the Sudan.  
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 In section three I explore how division along racial and tribal lines was instituted to develop 
and maintain differential subjugation between Arabs and Africans by the British colonizers. The 
inclusion of this analysis supports my broader argument regarding continual colonial influence 
in postcolonial political rationality and how this culminates in violent atrocities which the state 
has experienced in recent years.  
4.1 The colonisation of Sudan  
Sudan’s colonisation was a long and protracted process which was essentially a battle for its 
soul by the Turco-Egyptians and the British. In the midst of this battle the resistance of the 
Sudanese spearheaded by the Mahdiyya demonstrated the will of the Sudanese people to be 
free from the yoke of colonial rule. Such an expansive and all-encompassing period in a state’s 
history plays a significant role in shaping the future of the state, this is true of Sudan and its 
series of political crises that engulfed the country shortly after the state was loosed from the 
shackles of colonialism in 1955. Sudan’s colonial history is so extensive that it even predates the 
Berlin conference of 1884, which is widely acknowledged as the official inception of Africa’s 
colonization. This history is characterised by mainly two spheres of colonial power that will be 
the focus of this discussion; Turco-Egyptian rule as well Anglo-Egyptian rule (Johnson, 2003). 
What makes Sudan’s colonial history particularly compelling is the involvement of Egypt, 
another African state that embodied the role of both colonised and colonizer.  At the heart of 
Egyptian colonization of the Sudan lies its pursuit of an empire, which much like the entire 
trajectory of colonialism has the claim to territory as a signifier of power stimulating the desire 
to expand influence by means of occupation. Expansion of the Egyptian empire is at the heart 
of the historic occupation of Sudan and to this end the Egyptian powers demonstrated a 
homogenously colonial characteristic (Troutt-Powell, 2003).  
The central figure to the Egyptian occupation of Sudan was the ruler Muhammad Ali Pasha (4 
March 1769- 2 August 1849) who was so determined to expand Egyptian influence and power 
that he employed various scholars and engineers to facilitate this process of expansion. The 
meticulous process by which the historical narrative of the Sudan and its people was 
engineered through the use of cartography in particular is an affirmation of the importance of 
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the role that having colonies played in in ensuring the the success of the Egyptian empire 
(Troutt-Powell, 2003). This pursuit of territorial expansion was supplemented by the underlying 
assertion that “Arabic and Islam were superior to indigenous beliefs and languages and 
therefore should be emulated and even adopted genealogically” (Lesch, 1998:25).  
 It is little wonder that the Turco-Egyptian partnership developed as it did, with Egypt as the 
other half of this colonial alliance. At this time Egypt itself was a province in the Turkish 
Ottoman Empire, the military personal that carried out the occupation were Turkish speaking 
people and as such the conquest of Sudan was more so a Turkish rather than Egyptian affair 
despite the fact that Egypt had its ambitions of occupying Sudan in order to create and expand 
their own empire.  
Life under the rule of the Turco-Egyptian was largely harsh for the North and South Sudanese; 
the Turkish imposed stringent tax laws. These laws impacted negatively on the civilians’ 
economic activity, the manner in which the taxes were collected was also harsh and often, 
violence was inflicted on those who would not comply. With ever increasing revolts, the 
government tried to pacify the disgruntled majority by developing the North of Sudan (Ajayi, 
1989). For the non-Muslim people of Sudan however, this was not the case. The men were 
forcefully recruited to replenish the Egyptian army, the villages were raided for slaves and 
women and children were often attacked before being captured.   During these raids it was not 
only people that would be taken but also their cattle and ivory. These actions were not only 
limited to the South but were taken against all non-Muslim parts of the country, during this 
time, the tribes of Dinka, Shilluk and Ingessana in the East also suffered the same treatment 
(Lesch, 1998). 
In 1885 Turco-Egyptian rule was overthrown by the Mahdiyya, a fundamentalist religious 
movement led by Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdallah who declared himself to being the Mahdi, a 
Mahdi being the ordained leader to bring religious purity and justice to the world. The Mahdist 
troops triumphed against the stronger and better equipped Egyptian forces and by so doing in 
what were deemed an extraordinary feat, overthrew the Turco-Egyptian alliance (Ajayi, 1989). 
The disparities  between the North and the South was exacerbated during the Mahdiyya 
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tenure, the supremacy of Islam was enforced onto everyone and slave raids were resumed 
under the instruction of the Mahdi who justified it on the basis of the raids being a holy 
expedition, a crusade to convert unbelievers into believers. The Mahdiyya era saw Sudan being 
treated as a religious kingdom, actively seeking a return to pure Islam and instilling a 
fundamentalist approach to religious and cultural conduct, this regime sought to “purify and 
guide the believers whilst uprooting the corrupt and oppressive Turks” (Lesch, 1998:28).  By the 
time the British conquered the Mahdiyya in 1898 and established the Anglo- Egyptian 
condominium, this rupture between the North and the South was at an advanced stage and the 
two regions stood on opposite ends of the spectrum, culturally as well as economically.  
Religion, specifically Islam is a significant component in the Sudan’s colonial history in as much 
as it is significant in the postcolonial state. Sudan’s contentious religious situation has on its 
own been the topic for many years, demonstrating its significance in the story of the Sudan by 
being a comprehensive discipline. The Islam and Christianity dichotomy is at the heart of this 
religious controversy, often understood to be an issue characterised by strained relations 
between the African Christians of the South and the Muslim Arabs of the North, although this 
explanations does give a preview into the situation, the reality of the rising tensions and 
subsequent conflicts is a fundamentally more complex matter. Ulrich Mans captures the 
essence of this complexity when, in referring to the violence of the Darfur region, he states that 
“the growth of this new conflict indicates that Sudan’s civil war was never entirely a North-
South or a Muslim- Christian struggle but that it is a country-wide conflict that even 
incorporates other Muslim populations” (2004: 291). It is therefore critical that the extent to 
which colonialism has affected the contentious religious condition be explored.   
As it has already been explicated, religion has been an integral part of the colonizing strategy of 
the various powers; the Turco-Egyptian alliance used religion to differentiate the type of service 
delivery and economic development that the colonised people of Sudan would receive. The 
Arab Muslims in the North by virtue of their affiliation to Islam received proportionately better 
treatment than the non-Muslim population in the South by the Turco-Egyptian alliance, the 
Mahdiyya and as I will later explore in greater detail by the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. 
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Greater than administrative discrimination and what continues to be an issue of contention in 
contemporary Sudan is the imposition of Islam on non-Muslims; compulsion for the people of 
the South to convert to Islam was common during the slave raids (Lesch, 1998). In the 
postcolonial space, the pursuit of an Islamic state through political and legal channels became 
the official means by which the government endeavoured to transform the rest of the nation to 
Islam. The North being predominantly Islamic and being the place where the major seats of 
power were situated sought to convert the nation in its entirety (Natsios, 2012).  
What must be understood about the religious intricacies of Sudan is that they are influenced by 
the regional strength of Muslim Arabs who were and continue to be at the helm of government 
in the states neighbouring Sudan. Egypt in particular, which played the role of Sudan’s 
colonised colonizer, is a Muslim Arab led state. The complexity of the matter becomes apparent 
when one of the greatest antagonisms involves Muslims opposing each other.  An Arab Muslim 
can still regard an African Muslim with contempt. The Christian vs. Muslim argument is too 
simplistic and does not capture the full extent to which religion and its effects intersect with 
identity and ethnicity. The Darfur region conflict which will be covered extensively in the next 
chapter is an example of this intricacy. The troubles of that region demonstrate that even with 
a common religion, people can still find themselves on opposing ends with each other, 
particularly in the circumstance of inherent racism, the struggle of resources and economic 
strife (Ahluwalia, 2007).  
The Anglo-Egyptian condominium is such a crucial part of Sudan’s colonial history, perhaps 
even greater than the other forms of colonization that the country had become exposed to; this 
is owing to the role that this alliance has continued to play in Sudan’s postcolonial politics. 
Throughout this period, Egypt gradually came to have less influence over the Sudanese while 
British power gained traction (Natsios, 2012). The greatest consequence of British rule is the 
seemingly quiet support of the Islamisation and Arabization of Sudan, the disparate treatment 
of South Sudan was continued under this later stage of colonization, under their authority “the 
British pursued a policy of benign neglect in South Sudan, isolating it from the North” (Natsios, 
2012:31). The economic and social development of the South was further neglected whilst 
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provisions in the form of infrastructure and institutions for commerce, which were established 
by the British colonizers, further strengthened that of the North. When the time came for 
independence, the British left Islamic authorities in the North that would bolster the presence 
of Egyptian Islamists that were scattered across Sudan.  
4.2 Brutality and dominance  
The colonization of Sudan during the Turco-Egyptian era the Anglo-Egyptian condominium 
period as well as the Mahdiyya rule incorporated dominance based on the racialization of its 
people. The subjugation of native populations along racial lines is a mechanism that was used 
across the continent throughout the colonial period, as a strategy, inflicting terror onto the race 
of people that are being colonised is a calling card of imperial conquest, it establishes the 
colonizer as the conqueror and informs the conquered that their peaceful existence is reliant on 
the level to which they comply.    
Racial superiority had come to have an eminent role in Egypt’s advancing power across Sudan’s 
Southern region. The perceived racial and institutional superiority over African societies in 
general was heightened with Egypt’s encounter with the Sudanese and this racialization was 
transferred from an initial civilizing mission to a more specified acquisition directed at the 
perceived abominable people of Sudan (Johnson, 2003). A combination of racism and a messiah 
complex for wanting to civilize and bring light to a culturally and spiritually ‘lost’ people 
propelled the Egyptians to occupy Sudan and bring them into the light that Islam provided. 
Another reason Turko-Egyptian rule used to validate the occupation of Sudan was a defensive 
one, the Egyptians with the alliance of the Turkish sought to defend against an imperialist 
agenda from taking root. The Egyptians perceived British presence in Sudan as part of an 
elaborate divide and rule strategy, to advance their power across the continent and therefore 
envisaged their conquest of Sudan as a process of unifying the Nile Valley against foreign 
European intrusion (Warburg, 1991).  So although the occupation was depicted as bearing no 
aggression on the Sudanese, the opposite however proved to be true. The black Sudanese and 
in particular those belonging to the Nuba tribe, have for years been victim to abuse, 
unprovoked brutality and oppression.  
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The historic subjugation of the Nuba, beginning in the days of Sudan’s initial colonisation and 
intensified by the British Egyptian condominium colonial period displayed characteristically 
imperial agenda by both the Egyptians who were already under imperial rule and the British. 
Relating to which being an element of brutality featured in the subjugation of those considered 
racially, culturally and religiously inferior, as with all colonisation across the continent, the 
colonizers in question exercised varying levels of force and brutality in order to maintain 
dominance over the colonised people. It is imperative to decipher the unique challenges that 
faced the Nuba at this time because a lot of what takes place in the postcolonial state and the 
rationality process of the postcolonial government has its origins in how the indigenous people 
of the Nuba Mountains are treated by early colonizers (Mohamed, 1995). Ethnicity in the Nuba 
Mountains was a contentious issue that the Turco-Egyptian unit used to maintain divisions 
amongst the inhabitants. The involvement of these colonizers from 1821-1885 is characterised 
by relentless slave raids and the looting of natural resources. The plight of the Nuba people was 
further exacerbated by this contentious ethnic climate between them and two other groups; 
the Jelleba from North Sudan and the Baggarra who also resided in the mountains. These two 
groups were complicit in the raids against the Nuba; they assisted the Turco-Egyptians in 
raiding the Nuba people’s lands as well as enslaving them.   
The Turco-Egyptians used this strategic manoeuvring to inflict terror onto the Nuba and 
therefore maintain a firm grip on the political power that would maintain the status quo and 
ensure the endurance of their dominance. Terror and brutality play a crucial role in keeping 
oppressed under the yoke of said oppression; slavery in this instance became an important 
weapon in the colonizers arsenal. The Nuba people during the time of Islamization and 
Arabization in Sudan and even after Sudan had been appropriated as a colony did not assimilate 
into this dominant political culture. The land and natural resource appropriation as well as the 
enslavement of the Nuba came as a result of their quiet resistance to Islam as a religious 
standard and Arab as a racial ideology (Mohamed, 1995) 
The appropriation of Nubaland, which was later underwritten by the postcolonial state, is an 
indication of the extent to which the appropriators of power will go to maintain their position 
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of power. Intolerance of dissent informed both the colonial strategy against the Nuba as well as 
the postcolonial government’s response to their enmity. The unity of the people in the Nuba 
Mountains informed the transference of political strategy, during colonial occupation, this unity 
presented a threat to the empire, in the post colony, as a form of political rationality which 
entails violence as a means to an end, the government usurped Nubaland and declares war on 
the Nuba in response to their resistance against a much similar ideology. The genocide that 
ensues and mass displacement among the Nuba people has been the result of the postcolonial 
rationality process.  
Dominance and brutality are approaches that are intertwined in terms of how each relies on 
the other to effectively entrench colonial rule. Across the various epochs of Sudan’s 
colonisation, the respective foreign powers have been marked by their disposition towards 
subjugation. The Turco-Egyptian colonial period was marked by its contempt for Sudanese life 
expressed through the continual practice of slave trading even though Atlantic slave trading 
had been outlawed by the British in 1833 (Fluehr-Lobban, 1990). Slave trading in Khartoum was 
so pervasive that even after it had been outlawed it was still such a common practice to the 
extent that it maintained the capital as a bustling metropolis. The slaves were taken from the 
South and brought up into Khartoum for trade. The South of Sudan comprised predominantly of 
the African populace that had a darker skin complexion. They were considered inferior to the 
fairer Arabic people of the North and they were therefore damned in the eyes of Northerners 
and colonizers alike. The South was consequently deemed a location that was abundant in 
entities suited for enslavement by the racially and ethnically superior Arabs. The violence of 
how people were enslaved also has a great bearing on how these patterns are now 
perpetuated in the postcolonial space. “The slavers would surround the village, burning the 
huts and shooting to frighten the people, having caused disarray and turmoil in the village, the 
slavers would take mostly women and young adults, place forked poles on their shoulders, tie 
their hands to the pole in front, and bind children to their mothers” (Jok, 2001:5).  
Slavery as a form of violence is pivotal in Sudan’s story. It is perhaps the country’s greatest form 
of violence, so dehumanising and destructive in its nature that it is of great significance; 
46 
 
practiced extensively by colonizers and Sudanese alike. Of those who were fortunate enough to 
escape the slavers and the pillaging of the village that took place after the capture, their price 
for survival was poverty that stemmed from losing their cattle, family and all their goods. 
Poverty that would lead them to collaboration with their slavers in the next slaving expedition 
taking place in neighbouring villages. To collaborate with ones oppressor as a means of survival 
is an even worse kind of violence, the kind of violence that infringes on your dignity and 
conscience. As Jok Madut Jok notes “probably nothing more monstrous and cruel than this 
traffic had been experienced in South Sudan” (2001:6). The association of blackness with 
slavery and being rightfully enslavable depicts the process of othering to its full out extent, the 
notion of blacks as heathens and therefore deserving to be slaves removes the agency from 
those that perpetuate the slavery as they do not associate the black Africans with humanity and 
this sets the precedence for them to own and trade them as objects. 
4.3 Rule by division: the role of identity politics  
Generating division among the large groups of native inhabitants is not a concept unique to the 
case of Sudan. As we have seen, colonial rulers have long been employing the strategy of 
weakening the people by dividing them most commonly along ethnic and religious lines.  
“Divide and rule may be defined as the conscious effort of an imperialist power to create 
and/or turn to its own advantage the ethnic, linguistic, tribal, or religious differences within the 
population of a subjugated colony” (Morrock, 1973: 129). In the instance of existing tensions, 
the settlers have been the instigating force that exacerbates these tensions; this was the case 
of divisions in Sudan: historical differences were manipulated by the successive factions to keep 
the distinct groups opposed to each other and therefore abate the likelihood that they would 
ever come together against foreign powers.  
There are a number of factors that must be considered when assessing the dynamics that lead 
to these divisions. Chief among these is the race/tribe dichotomy. Adequate comprehension of 
the difference in classification of these two concepts elucidates the reasons why Sudan is 
plagued by dissidence over identity amongst its people. The differentiation of indigenous 
people along tribal lines is a strategy which has been used across the continent. Bringing race 
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into the parameters of that differentiation further exacerbates tensions, more so in the case of 
Sudan which has had a protracted history of animosity between the African and Arab people 
long before the British colonizers arrived.  In order to adequately interpret what this 
differentiation meant for the people of Sudan it is imperative to comprehend what these terms 
meant respectively. The colonizers strategy introduced the division of people along racial/tribal 
lines in place of colonizer and colonised (Mamdani, 2012). This classification signalled the 
introduction of a new category natives and non-natives, according to Mamdani “non-natives 
were tagged as races whereas natives were said to belong to tribes” (2012:47).  
Those belonging to the race category were essentially all those who were deemed as not being 
indigenous to the African continent e.g. Europeans, Asians and Arabs, those classified as 
belonging to tribes were therefore indigenous to the continent, in the case of Sudan, the black 
Africans. What shifting the focus from colonizer and colonised to race and tribe did, was 
effectively divide the colonised into two distinct groups. This new specification for division had 
a number of implications, particularly for those deemed as belonging to the tribe grouping; 
firstly the tribal grouping was based on distinguishing between indigenous tribes and non-
indigenous races, a differentiation that focuses on the single criteria of origin. This process 
effectively discounts all other processes that contribute to the existence of a people and by so 
doing the native is depicted as a geographical consequence rather than a product of history 
(Mamdani, 2012). Another implication was the legal ramifications it produced, customary law 
governed people classified as belonging to tribes and civil law governed those classified using 
the category of race. Customary law was not uniform amongst the tribes, “each tribe was ruled 
under a separate set of laws, there were thus many sets of customary laws as there were said 
to be tribes” (Mamdani, 2012:48). The differences between the tribes were accentuated to 
justify the need for the numerous customary laws, these differences in actual fact were little 
more than slight variations. As Mamdani notes, “no matter how different they were, tribes 
were neighbours and usually spoke languages that were mutually intelligible: they also claimed 
histories that were at times shared, at other times overlapping” (2012:48). On the other hand 
those belonging to different races, despite how vastly they varied from each other in terms of 
language, culture and country of birth were governed by a single extrinsic European law which 
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was adapted to the convenience of the colonial context. In this sense Asians and Europeans 
were regarded as being more similar than people who come from the same continent and 
country and predominantly adhere to the same cultural practices and beliefs with only slight 
aberrations in their execution.  
The race/tribe dichotomy is intrinsic to Sudan’s Arab/ African discord. It is in the words of 
Muddathir ‘Abd Rahim “Sudan is at one and the same time both African and Arab” (1970: 233). 
The Arabisation and Islamisation of the Northern part of Sudan is part of a larger project of 
Islamisation that has been taking place since the seventh century across the Northern parts of 
Africa. Sudan being an expansive geographical location sustained the separation of the South 
from the North thereby creating circumstances favourable to the development of a Southern 
identity that was not influenced by the Islamisation of the North. The invasion of Britain over 
Sudan, brought with it a tribalised administration of the colony, this is not to be understood as 
the same as the presence of tribes which were there long before the British invasion. Tribalising 
is a specific action that is taken with the intention of highlighting divisions and othering a group 
of people. The British invasion is therefore an act synonymous with the colonial process, the 
tribe as it is conceptualized is an ethnic group with a common language, the act therefore of 
tribalising seeks to emphasise the common ground that supposedly united members of a tribe 
and by so doing differentiates them from other tribes (Kruger, 2007). Classification along tribal 
lines also entrenches the notion that tribes are fundamentally rural and their entire identities 
are therefore supposedly unsophisticated.  
Prior to colonisation there was an abundance of tribal groups but the existence of tribes in 
precolonial times did not promulgate the systematic discrimination of a people; tribes before 
colonialism did not “define access to land and participation in local governance and rules for 
settling disputes according to tribal identity” (Mamdani, 2012:73). The British, in their 
colonisation of Sudan used this approximation of all non-Arab Sudanese being consumed by the 
parameters of their tribe to put into place policies that would effectively disfavour them to a 
greater extent than their Northern and Arab counterparts. In order to appreciate the impact 
and therefore the role played by British colonisation in the identity politics of Sudan, the 
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constitution of interaction between Arab and non-Arab Sudanese must be comprehended. The 
term Sudan itself is at the centre of this cause célèbre as it was regarded in antithesis to Bidan 
which means white, Sudan was ergo black (Rahim, 1970). Sudan as a word (black) and as the 
name of a state that derives from the term bilad al Sudan which when translated means the 
lands of the blacks, as Rahim construes in his narrative of origins “medieval Arabs used the 
expression Bilad al Sudan to denote in general 'the lands of the Blacks', and in particular the 
territories which today roughly correspond to the 'Sudanic' group of African states” (1979:237). 
Furthermore “the terms Sudan and Sudani are still sometimes used, especially by members of 
the older generation among the Northern Sudanese, with reference to the non-Muslim and 
non-Arabised sections of the population, particularly in the Southern provinces” (Rahim, 
1970:2370).  
When taking into cognizance this antecedent of race and identity politics, the actions of the 
British to racialize Arabs and tribalise the Africans validates Arab concepts of African inferiority 
and rationalizes subsequent African subjugation. The conceptualization of the Southern policy 
(which will later in the chapter be explained in further detail) is an essential indicator of this 
validation. The British perceived the South, being what they deemed native and therefore tribal 
as needing to develop separately from the North. Their claim was that the plans of 
industrialization and progression that they had for the rest of the state would be too profound 
for the natives belonging to tribes in the South.  As Moyo notes “The policy of the Government 
in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with 
structures and organization based upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs” 
(1994: 167). This is how the tribalising and the retribalizing of the South occurred, confining 
their identity to a particular existence and discounting the nuances that characterize the 
identity of a group of people that happen to belong to a tribe. There are variations within that 
tribe and amongst the tribes, despite the common ground on which they are based (more 
common than racial differences), the people belonging to a tribe, their needs and the culture of 
the tribe itself is ever evolving. What the British reasoning behind this separate development 
has done is that it has frozen these tribes in time. The consequence of that is the 
underdevelopment of the South within the context of a developing nation.  
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Beyond the differentiation of tribal and racial identities, there are four cardinal approaches to 
the successful application of a divide and rule strategy that were practised by European 
colonialists across the continent: they generated dissent among the conquered inhabitants; 
they magnified the already existing differences, exploited this dissention to the benefit and 
strengthening of their power and also politicized these differences so that they are carried over 
into the postcolonial space (Morrock, 1973). These approaches are all discernable in the Sudan 
case; the Anglo-Egyptian condominium with the British at the helm was instrumental in 
heightening the tensions between the Sudanese citizens, in particular, the British isolation of 
the South from the rest of the country by designating is as a closed district. I have addressed 
one aspect of closed districts thus far, that of tribalizing a people, as a means of control the 
concept of closed districts was also predicated on the basis of keeping the North and other 
foreign influences out of the South in order to prevent unsanctioned influence. The British 
feared that the influence of Islam and Arab culture would undermine their rule and saw it fit to 
ensure that the one part of Sudan that did not have such an extensive Muslim Arab influence 
be kept that way (Rahim, 1966).  
During this time, by virtue of the British colonial method of differentiation the economic, 
political and social state of both the North and the South resembled that of two separate 
countries. In addition to isolation from Islam the British actively supported the establishment of 
Christian mission schools and the advanced Christianity in the South, this formulation of Arab 
Islam North and Christian African South came to be detrimental to the progress of the South 
since it did not entail the necessary development of the South, this further reinforced the 
concept that the North by virtue of it being Islamic and Arabic was far superior to the South 
(Johnson, 2003).  
Sudan’s colonialization was advanced along the lines of differentiation and discord amongst the 
people. From the Turco-Egyptians to the latter British-Egyptian condominium, there exists a 
common thread of exploiting subtle differences and historic prejudices to keep the nation 
fragmented. The othering of Africans and non-Muslims as a colonial project creates the 
circumstance of seeking to maintain and project to the outside world the concept of Sudan as 
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an Arab and Islamic state, feeding into the measures taken by Sudan’s various regimes in the 
post colony to advance this projection. This chapter has demonstrated the direct links that 
Sudan’s early colonisation has with the states postcolonial political rationality procedure, the 
following chapter will outline how the process of postcolonial rule as influenced by Sudan’s 
colonial history has had at its core political rationality that premised on the basis of survival and 
ensuring best possible outcome for those holding power in government as well as those 
challenging the administration of said government, both adversaries advancing at the expense 
of the civilians, an expense that is evidenced by the patterns of violence and atrocity that are a 
common feature.  
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Chapter 5: The implications of Sudan’s political rationality on the contemporary 
patterns of violence and atrocity 
 
“The Sudan has been subjected to alien rule for considerable periods during its modern history; 
its existing boundaries, administrative institutions, and cultural outlook have been largely 
molded by its colonial masters” Muddathir 'Abd al-Rahim (1966:29) 
The conflation of postcolonial political rationality and Sudan’s colonial inheritance is a critical 
circumstance in the overall discourse of factors that influence contemporary patterns of 
violence and atrocity in the African continent. Sudan’s various governing structures since 
independence, have with often unfortunate outcomes engaged the process of political 
rationality in the administrative affairs of the state. This rationality forms the very basis of the 
decision making process. In the case of Sudan as with most governments of the post colony as 
the survival of various administrations after achieving independence hinges on the outcomes 
that result from this rationality process.   
Political rationality as a concept as well as Sudan’s colonial background has been extrapolated 
at length in prior chapters; it is however important to now analyse how this rationality has 
influenced the violence and atrocity that has taken place throughout the various parts of the 
state. The following chapter seeks to firstly expound how political rationality has been 
embodied by the government and furthermore how this has affected the state of Sudan with 
regards to the ensuing violence that has continued to grip the nation. This chapter will be 
divided into three sections; in section one I explore how independence came about as a result 
of British need to renege any responsibility they had towards the Sudanese and what 
implications this process rendered. In section two I analyse the process of political rationality by 
the respective governments and how it has influenced Sudan’s two civil wars. Section three is 
where I assess Sudan’s state sponsored conflict and how the construct of violence is a form of 
political rationality. This supports my argument that Sudan’s violence regardless of heinousness 
of the atrocities it renders is never a random process and has it at its basis been rationalized by 
those in positions of power. 
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5.1 Sudan’s colonial shadow at the dawn of independence  
Colonisation as a systematic institution cultivated and enacted the notion that that there is 
substantial gain could be acquired from the consistent subjugation of a people, this notion was 
not only limited to Sudan’s conduct but to other African states post-independence. The 
tribe/race dichotomy which has been addressed in the preceding chapter is central to the 
gestation of this notion, more so with regards to the analysis of the root causes conflicts and 
violent atrocities on the continent.  
The colonial era did more to entrench pre-existing differences between the Sudanese people to 
limit their impact. The era of British rule in particular proved to have the least interest for the 
Southern region of Sudan and although the isolation of South Sudan from the rest of the 
country was justified on the grounds of having its majority Christian and African civilians at 
heart, the opposite proved to be true (Rahim, 1966). What the British in fact aimed to do by 
isolating the South was to pacify the region, beginning with a careful demarcation of a 
threshold designed to keep the people of the South from venturing into supposed Northern 
territory, this as they postulated as part of their greater project of abolishing the slave trade. 
This is a curious feat since the British having abolished slave trade in 1833 in the territories 
administered by the crown, did not use that opportunity to promote autonomy and liberty in 
the South; instead their conduct and policies pertaining to the South depicted and 
intensification the concept of Northern racial superiority (Rahim, 1966). The racial hierarchy 
entrenched by the North was reinforced by the British through biased education policies that 
provided academic justifications for supposed Southern inferiority. Through these policies they 
"favoured Arab’ males for the academic education that would lead to administrative jobs, 
meanwhile guiding those of slave descent, whom the British in the early years of the twentieth 
century variously called ‘Sudanese’ or ‘detribalized blacks’ into army careers and manual jobs” 
(Rahim, 1966: 29). There was an inherently divisive strategy along tribal and racial lines at play 
that the British exploited as a result of their own inherent racist disposition; these credence’s 
were projected on to the Sudanese and thereby maintained the status quo of subjugation.  
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The British gave immense concession to the Northern population and as they were the colonial 
structure at the helm of power, this resulted in serious implications for the states development 
process especially in a country such as Sudan where the circumstances of language, religion, 
and culture are so interconnected to each that it is impossible to emphasize one concept 
without referencing another (Nyombe, 1994). As Deng notes “what generates conflict is not the 
mere differences of identities, but the implications of those differences in the sharing of power, 
wealth, social services, employment and development opportunities” (Deng, 2007: 2).  
The racialization of Sudan by the British can therefore be seen as the first and most crucial step 
in the perpetual antagonism between the central government and the Southern bulk of the 
country and the violence and atrocities that are intrinsic to that antagonism. The independent 
central government that rose to power in 1955 after the British departure has subsumed this 
racialization into its administrative practice and as a politically rational approach, racial 
homogenizing has ensured limited access to services for those who are not considered to be 
Arabic (Sharkey, 2007). It denotes a great deal to the rationality aspect of the North’s political 
strategy and is quite telling that this indifference was anticipated by Southerners who 
expressed their weariness to the British departing before correcting the imbalances they had 
played such a great part in creating. The mutiny of 1955 that took place just four months before 
independence was officially declared on the 1st of January 1956 bears testament to Southern 
disgruntlement. 
The mutiny which sparked the beginning of Sudan’s first civil war came as a result of the build 
up to independence which incidentally came about as a result of international diplomacy than 
as a result of a strong drive towards nationalism by Sudanese factions advocating for autonomy 
(Johnson, 2003). This is an important factor to note because British involvement in the build up 
to independence as well as their role in the establishment of administrative apparatus impacts 
the respective civil wars and the persistent unrest quite fundamentally.  The months preceding 
independence were not jubilant months of hopeful expectation for the people of the South, 
one would expect that an end to colonial rule would excite the colonised; instead there was a 
sense of foreboding and large discontent among the Southern population. “The rapid increase 
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of Northerners in the South as administrators, senior officers in the army and police, teachers in 
government schools and as merchants increased Southern fears of Northern domination and 
colonization” (Johnson, 2003:27). According to the South, the departure of the British and the 
encroachment of Northerners into their enclave was tantamount to trading one form of 
oppression for another. The general sentiment in the South was that the slave trade would be 
renewed and blacks of the South would once more be taken as the property of the 
Northerners.  
The mutiny, as a characteristic of this widespread Southern discontent broke out in the summer 
of 1955, when the sentinel at Torit, the headquarters of the Equatorial Corps rebelled against 
what they considered to be the imminent occupation of the South by the North. Despite pleas 
from British missionaries for Britain to reassert order and intervene in the crisis, Britain refused 
opting instead to assist the incoming government made up predominantly of Northerners to 
restore order in Torit as well as to enforce order in other parts of the South that had 
disturbances (Johnson, 2003). Even their supposed inaction and intervention to supporting the 
Sudanese troops was a statement that communicated support of the incoming North 
dominated government. The fact that the mutineers who were from the South were caught, 
tried and executed by the Sudanese army with the backing of Britain speaks volumes to who 
the law and who governance favoured. The Southern people’s worst fears of Northern 
domination were slowly being realized and perhaps the greatest testimony to British apathy 
regarding their involvement in the creation of this hostile environment was that they hastened 
towards Sudanese independence despite the absence of a definitive agreed upon   constitution 
and clear guidelines on how governance would encompass both North and South needs in 
equal measure. “Thus the date of independence was brought forward, and the Sudan became a 
fully independent nation with numerous issues of its nationhood still unresolved on 1 January 
1956” (Johnson, 2003: 29).  
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5.2 The nature of Sudan’s political rationality 
In his paper titled, ‘a rational kind of madness’?, David Keen attempts to unpack the rather 
complex nature of the inherent rationality during conflict situations, so as to demonstrate that  
within the discourse of ensuing violence and atrocities, conflict is not just a thoughtless act of 
anarchy(Keen, 1997). Conflict and the subsequent mass scale violence and atrocity forms part 
of a political and often economic process. The concept of rationality is inherent in this process; 
the ascension of a predominantly Northern cabinet to power in spite of Southern dissent posed 
a constant threat to the legitimacy of their power and henceforth survival as a concept of 
rational political manoeuvring becomes a significant point of analysis. The analysis point of 
Sudan presents a thought provoking dynamic in the analysis of violent conflict in the way that 
the use of violence is primarily contrived by the state against its citizens within the frame work 
of political rationality.  
The civil wars that engulfed the state entail insight into not only violence and atrocity but how 
rationality and historical context intersect at the birthing of atrocities. The first civil war in 
particular being largely influenced by the effects of the erstwhile mutiny and the South’s overall 
disappointment in Britain’s handover of power to the North was initiated by the failure of both 
the North and the South to come to an agreement on a mutually beneficial federal constitution. 
Shortly after independence a government consisting of mostly Northerners rejected the entire 
concept of a federation and this led the South Sudanese political movement to become a more 
effective organization that won most of the Southern seats in parliament (Johnson, 2003). The 
possibility of federalism experienced resurgence and the momentum behind this resurgence led 
the government to hand over the state to the army, effectively squashing any possibility of 
federalism in the near and creating optimum conditions for the beginning of a civil war.  
The military government from 1958, embarked on a nationwide campaign of Islamization and 
Arabization with specific focus on the Christian and African South. By 1964 all Christian 
missionaries were expelled from the South and Arabic was instituted as the medium of 
instruction in schools. The response to these repressive activities was guerrilla warfare from the 
Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) movement, which comprised of Southern senior 
57 
 
political figures. Their opposition was met with further repression from the government which 
in turn fuelled the rebellion until the break out of outright civil war beginning in 1964 (Johnson, 
2003).  
In 1969 Khartoum had had several governments all advancing the policies of Islamization and 
Arabization and all exacerbating the ongoing civil war. This  was until Colonel Jaafar al Numayri 
toppled the government and effectively also brought an end to the war. Numayri moved swiftly 
to introduce reform and a possible solution to the ‘Southern problem.’ Soon after taking office 
“he announced that the civil war would be resolved through political negotiation, not military 
victory and proceeded to devise a new system of decentralized self-government in the South” 
(Natsios, 2012: 47). Perhaps the greatest achievement of Numayri’s tenure was the facilitation 
of the Addis Ababa agreement, a peace settlement between the North and the South that was 
agreed to by both parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. According to the agreement, a federal state 
of Sudan was to be created in which the South would be regulated by a legislative assembly and 
a council of ministers. The Southerners running this Southern government would be assigned 
by Numayri and on the issue of language; English was to be the official medium of instruction in 
schools as well as the official language of the South. It appeared that peace was finally at hand 
for Sudan (Natsios, 2012).  
This peace, however, was to be short-lived owing to a number of dynamics, chief among them 
being economics. Economic dynamics are a key point in political rationality processes, they are 
prominent features of all political activity and the case of Sudan is no different, in particular 
when the discovery of oil reserves is brought into the fray. This highly valued natural resource 
was discovered in the South after the Addis Ababa agreement was signed and a regional 
government established under Numaryi’s rule.  The disturbance in the South was precipitated 
by the central government in the North when they did not consult the regional government of 
the South regarding concessions granted to Chevron and Total to proceed with drilling in the 
oilfields in 1982 (Patey, 2007).  
These oilfields were naturally a highly contested area and the dispute over them exacerbated 
the ensuing battle between the central government in Khartoum and the South. With tensions 
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already high and the newly established peace at a fragile state, the dispute as to where the 
refineries should be established was a factor that impelled antipathy between the two regions 
and drove Khartoum to use heinous measures against the people of the South (Patey, 2007). 
The central government wanted the refinery to be built in Northern Sudan whilst the regional 
government wanted the refinery to be built close to the oilfields, in the Upper Nile Province to 
be exact. This dispute was fundamentally an economic and territorial one, the establishment of 
the refinery in any area indicated accompanying development and prosperity for that area 
resulting from the revenues that produced from refining and subsequent market involvement 
(Johnson, 2003).  
Notwithstanding the logistic reasoning of the oilfields physically being situated in the Southern 
region and therefore requiring that the refinery also be in the same proximity, the regional 
government of the South also expressed the grievance that should the refinery be established 
in the North, Southern development would continue to stagnate whilst the already developed 
North would accelerate in its development process. The regional government perceived that 
the act of building refineries in the North would essentially be taking business to a thriving part 
of the country and damning the underdeveloped South to permanent distress (Johnson, 2003).  
The objections and reasoning of the South would go on to be discounted by the central 
government who went ahead and ordered that refineries be constructed outside of the South. 
The central government, cognisant of the existing tensions and concerns from the South, 
nonetheless continued with this action. At this juncture it is important to articulate how the 
political rationality aspect becomes intrinsic to the process of Khartoum’s governance.  
Colonel Numayri’s government at the time was experiencing an economic crisis due to the 
mismanagement of the nation’s capital and disgruntlement amongst the Sudanese, particularly 
those in the North was growing (Johnson, 2003). The rectification of Sudan’s budget woes was 
distinctly evidenced by the “direct pipeline from Bentiu oilfields to Port Sudan, via Khartoum, 
enabling a quick export of crude oil to offset some of the Sudan’s deficit” (Johnson, 2003:46). It 
was therefore in the best interest of Numayri’s political future that he manipulated the 
revenues from extraction and refining to fix the economic quagmire that his government was 
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in. This meant ensuring his survival as head of state even if this was at the expense of peace 
with the South. In terms of political rationality, Numayri considered himself to be great bringer 
of peace to Sudan. He rationalized that this circumstance would absolve him from the backlash 
that may result from the wrath of the Sudanese for compromising the fragile peace accord with 
the South.  
These choices largely influenced by but not limited to the economic status of the country led to 
the outbreak of Sudan’s second civil war and the eventual downfall of the Numayri regime. The 
second civil war saw the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang, 
the SPLM under the leadership of Garang would go on to fight against the government of Sudan 
until the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  
Numayri’s gradual rescinding of the Addis Ababa agreement terms such as the language 
agreement and the appointment of council members infuriated the Southerners. By 1983 
Numayri had effectively obliterated what was left of the agreement and had taken over the 
state apparatus of Southern Sudan. A full scale civil war broke out soon after this, the war 
coupled with growing unpopularity amongst even those of his own ranks due to the 
deteriorating economic situation all culminated in a bloodless coup that ended Numayri’s 
tenure. This was to be followed by the Al Bashir reign which at the time of this report continues 
to hold power in Sudan.  
At this point of the discussion it is imperative to briefly contextualize, in particular, the 
economic parameters of war affected by and affecting all parties that are active participants, 
whether insurgents or the state. The economic benefits of war are not only limited to the 
revenues that can be garnered or the funds received by rebels, which are used to purchase 
arms. The very act of war itself can be used for financial gain. 
The prevailing character of Sudan’s civil wars is that warring factions have used it to fulfil their 
economic interests, therefore meaning that peace would not be an economically viable solution 
for them (Patey, 2007). The looting of civilians as a lucrative economic strategy was not 
confined to the above mentioned regimes but successive contemporary governments have also 
employed this strategy as an integral part of their arsenal to be used against the subjugated 
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Southern groups “the Sudanese government's military sponsorship of Misiriyya and Baqqara 
nomadic tribes in the North transformed violence into a way of life. Khartoum encouraged 
ethnic tensions by granting Arabic herdsmen an unwritten licence to pillage and destroy the 
communities of the Dinka and Nuer African pastoralists of the South”  (Patey, 2007:1001).  
Khartoum’s political rationality is not only limited to economic inducement; the very act of 
conflict is in itself a beneficial factor. On a much broader scale there is the further concept of 
war economies, Sudan and the oilfields debacle is exemplary of this concept that characterises 
so many other conflict ridden areas in Africa and also on a global scale. According to Malone 
and Nitzschke, “war economies in fact serve different functions for different conflict 
stakeholders” (2005: 6). In this regard, the political rationality of violence and atrocity extends 
beyond the central government and includes the rebel and any other insurgent groups who 
may stand to benefit from conflict and atrocities inflicted on civilians. In the case of Sudan, the 
political rationality of using war to achieve an envisaged outcome is coalescence between two 
methods of rationality as earlier indicated by Foucault’s theories. Rationality as a means to an 
end and rationality as a way to achieve a desired outcome, regarding Bashir’s government and 
the 1999 upheaval with the Canadian based  oil company, Talisman’s activities in Sudan. It was 
apparent that the central government used the revenues procured from the business with said 
company to fund its military campaign against the Southern insurgency and used those 
weapons to bomb civilians in their villages resulting in a humanitarian crisis. The rationality 
process here is immensely complex as it involves an amalgamation of economic gain as well as 
the legitimization of othering by depicting weakness and unworthiness of a population group 
that has been identified as being the outlier (Easey, 2011).  
This particular approach to political rationality being the envisaged ‘public enemy’ entails the 
demonizing of certain groups for political gain. This aspect also then builds on the prior 
discussed phenomenon in the preceding chapter of divide and rule methods. The interpretation 
provided by Keen illuminates how beneficial it was for the postcolonial government to rule by 
division despite the harrowing consequences that it rendered. It became quite apparent with 
the succession of regimes that “some groups have effectively been placed “above the law”, 
61 
 
others have been positioned “below the law” (1997: 71). Placing a group of people below the 
law is to ensure that they kept in the periphery of the state structure. The Southern region has 
to this end been specifically ‘othered’ by their racial and religious make up and the fact that the 
lion’s share of the country’s resources, including oil, water and fertile soil, that are so pivotal to 
its restoration are located in the South, makes the central governments ‘war’ against the South 
the epicentre of its rationality (Malone and Nitzschke, 2005). If the central government can 
succeed in its depiction that the African Christians of the South are inherently weaker and are 
essentially the damned in the face of a much stronger and conquering chosen Arab Muslims 
then it stands to reason that they are firstly fair game for the attacks meted against them and 
they are also incapable of presiding over the resources existing in their region. Therefore 
Khartoum, being the better-equipped and inherently stronger force will be privy to the 
command over these resources and also have the justification for the continued subjugation of 
the South (Keen, 1997). Violent atrocities are natural outcomes to othering, whether as a form 
of retaliation or when meted out in a process of rationality against those classified as deserving 
recipients of violence, the very act of othering is a violent process in itself and it begets a 
violent consequence.   
5.3 The interconnection of violence and political rationality in Sudan’s state sponsored 
conflict 
The prevalence of violence in Africa has resulted from a number of reasons, chief among those 
being the convergence of colonial legacies and postcolonial political rationality. These violent 
patterns are varied, nuanced and stem largely out of physical insecurity, which in the case of 
Sudan occurred at the point of decolonization, when the independent government assumed 
power. Generally physical insecurity occurs when there is fundamental change that disrupts the 
functioning of a state and when the unpredictability and consequent period of unrest proves to 
be too much for the majority to bear (Keen, 1997). A lack of accountability to the citizens is the 
number one cause for this type of insecurity, when the states army, police force and national 
defence system is answerable only to the holders of office or to a small group of the larger 
populace, the result is that there is a predominant sense of disgruntlement and unease among 
the larger population and people will feel compelled to ensure that they defend themselves 
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against external physical threats. It is an even greater crisis when the threat comes from within 
the borders and there is a need to defend against the very state that is supposed to provide 
security (Duffield, 2002). The emergence of rebel groups and militia is common place. 
General Omar Al Bashir staged a coup in 1989, during a time when Sudan was beginning to 
transition to democracy, with the harsh Islamist state that had taken shape under Numayri’s 
rule dwindling and making way for the possibility of a democratic pluralist society. Sudan’s 
second civil war was still raging on during this time and the humanitarian crisis it rendered 
influenced the various parties including the Umma Party which was the ruling party at the time 
to move towards a peaceful agreement that could remedy the situation (Lesch, 1998).  This 
peace process was thwarted by a group of midranking army officers led by al-Bashir; this coup 
signalled a new chapter of repression for Sudan’s non-Muslim and non-Arab population. The 
Bashir governments Islamist disposition was determined to completely reconstruct Sudanese 
institutions in a manner that would be too intricate to reverse. The newly established Islamist 
state was intolerant of dissent of any kind, adhering to strict sharia laws and coming down 
swiftly on those whose actions in accordance to Islamic parameters were haram. Haram being 
anything that is prohibited by Islamic law, according to Natsios, “Sudan did not have a history of 
repression on this scale, even the two former military governments had acted with comparative 
restraint during the times of political crisis and were removed from power with limited loss of 
life” (2012:84).  
The crisis and atrocities of the Darfur region has made Bashir and regime notorious for human 
rights violations, the refugee disaster and genocide. The story of Darfur as it been made public 
to the world does not begin in 2003, but dates back to 1987 when natural circumstances 
exacerbated the already fragile state of interaction with Khartoum: famine, drought and 
shifting dessert patterns of the Sahara desert that caused mass migration were the prominent 
causes that resulted in ethnic conflicts, violent crimes and political calamities that demanded 
urgent attention from the central government (Johnson, 2003). The government regarded 
Dafuris and their crisis with contempt. By failing to respond effectively to this crisis, subsequent 
governments beginning with Numayri’s lost favour with the people of the Darfur region.  
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These natural and ecological challenges are instrumental in the alliance between Fur political 
activists of the Darfur region and the SPLM led at the time by John Garang. Despite the SPLM 
having its roots in the Southern region as a movement against the government’s discrimination 
of the predominantly African population of the South, the struggles of the Darfuri people also 
found expression through the SPLM’s insurgency against the central government, a case of a 
common enemy. According to Garang, the root cause of all of Sudan’s problems irrespective of 
region was “the chronic neglect and abuse of the periphery of the country by Khartoum” 
(Natsios, 2012:129). This conceptualization of Sudan’s challenges made it relatively easy for the 
SPLM to co-opt Darfuri activists into their ranks and orchestrate a protracted system of 
rebellion against the central government. The recruitment of Daud Bolad, a Darfur activist into 
the ranks of the SPLM, signalled the first monumental alliance between the Southern region 
and the Darfur’s rebellion against the central government. 
The 2003 rebellion in Darfur which sparked international outrage over reports of genocide and 
mass displacement was as a result of the regions three African tribes resistance to the Arab 
supremacist movement that was spreading across the region. There was fundamental racial 
component to this Arab supremacy as was historically where the Africans by virtue of being 
black were deemed worthy to be crushed and enslaved. The response from Khartoum to this 
rising Arab supremacy was to effectively ignore the pleas for help from the Darfuri and to 
instead arm Arab militia in order to obliterate the African rebellion. The horror of the Darfur 
conflict was that it was a less of a conflict and more of an ethnic cleansing crusade by the 
Janjaweed that entailed the slaughter of young men in the village, raping and killing of women 
and children, burning of villages and looting of the Darfuri herds (Willemse, 2005). The Bashir 
government’s blatant support for this ethnic cleansing campaign is what eventually caused the 
Darfur crisis to escalate to genocide.  
This is where political rationality once again is drawn into the scope of focus. With the peace 
agreement in the South becoming more imminent and the prospect of Sudan’s protracted civil 
war coming to an end, the militia, known as the Janjaweed was recruited and funded by Bashir 
and his government for the purposes of war could no longer be used in the North South civil 
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war which was coming to an end. It was common for the government of Sudan to use Arab 
nomads as militia, as they had recruited them during the civil war with the South, not only 
Bashir but Sudan’s other regimes had employed the use of these militia throughout the conflict 
with their Southern adversaries, even during the relatively democratic period of Sudan’s history 
between 1985-1989, Sadiq al-Mahdi was known to use these nomads to squash arising 
disturbances.  The rising rebellion in the Darfur region presented an opportunity for Bashir to 
once again call upon the services of the nomads, who now no longer had a definitive role to 
play (Willemse, 2005).  In the aspect of rationality, the availability and effectiveness of the 
Janjaweed as well as their ability to easily access and navigate the terrain of the arid Darfur 
region (by horseback) provided Bashir with the promulgation to call on the these militia who 
were now technically unemployed.  
Just like the violent conflicts in the Nuba Mountains and the Darfur region, the ongoing war in 
the Southern region which, in 2011 has eventually led to the secession of the South from Sudan 
to form its own independent state. The government of Sudan has on every facet exacerbated 
the tensions that sparked monumental differences between them and their adversaries being 
their fellow Sudanese people.  If ever there was a case of irreconcilable differences between 
the warring factions of insurgents and governments, the secession of South Sudan would be the 
best example. Since the independence of Sudan from British colonial authority in 1956, 
relations between the North and the South have been strained. Indeed, relations between the 
people of these two regions have been immensely undesirable long before the departure of the 
British but independence brought into the fray dynamics of the political rationality of 
independent governance that when coupled with colonial influence threw the country into an 
extensive period of civil war (Manby, 2012).  
The SPLM insurgency from the Second World War was born out of the South Sudanese people’s 
need to be more forceful in getting their grievances recognized by the government and also  
the great need to protect defend themselves against state military powers in the conflicts that 
took place shortly after independence. The British segregation of the North and South regions 
from each other meant that by the time of independence both regions were essentially 
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estranged. In the run up to independence, Southerners were excluded from the negotiations 
where the terms of the rising independent state were to be discussed. After these negotiations, 
Sudan’s first elections independent elections where the self-governing state was to emerge 
were contested by the South who knew that they would be ostracized should the North have 
the monopoly of power over the state. The appointment of Northerners to all executive 
positions in the South after the election marked the beginning of what was to be over fifty 
years of conflict between the North and the South and the latest, war in the Darfur which all 
began in 1955 with the mutiny of the sentinel at Torit against Northerners (Manby, 2012).  
What this chapter has illustrated is how rationality, colonial history and a protracted process of 
othering all converge to create, influence and maintain the contemporary patterns of violence 
and atrocity that have been experienced by the troubled state of Sudan. This chapter has 
illustrated how the two civil wars and war in Darfur have primarily resulted from poor 
governance actions that are influenced by racial and identity dynamics, which seek to depict a 
heterogeneous Sudan as a homogenous state.  This chapter has demonstrated how conflict that 
results in atrocity can itself be used as a strategy to achieve a greater agenda. In this sense, 
destabilisation when enacted as part of a political process and entailing a set of outcomes can 
be perceived to be following a rational cognitive process. It is therefore imperative to discern 
how at the heart of violence is a complex process that culminates in said violent outcome.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Overview of the findings 
This aim of this report has been to determine the extent to which political rationality as it 
relates to Africa’s colonial history accounts for contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity 
in postcolonial Sudan. The impact of colonial legacies on the post colony, when coupled with 
the choices made by independent governments, has resulted in grave consequences for African 
countries, regional relations as well global dynamics. A common consequence is the occurrence 
of violence that takes shape in numerous forms and the atrocities suffered as a result by 
innocent civilians who are not active participants in these acts of violence, but who are its 
greatest victims. This consequence has been the concern of this report and has equally 
concerned scholars and theorists and has influenced them to seek explanations to these 
atrocities. Explanations that will provide valuable insight into these detrimental circumstances 
so as to counter the occurrence of future violence and facilitate the process of developing the 
implantation of solutions for existing of violent atrocities. The choices made by independent 
governments are indicative of a rational decision making process and it is of paramount 
importance that the nature of this rationality and how it is characterized be conceptualized if 
the triggers of violent atrocities are to be identified and comprehended. The report sought to 
determine what impact colonialism had on the postcolonial process of political rationality and 
how the dynamics of both elements; colonial legacies as well political rationality impacted on 
the occurrence of violent atrocities in postcolonial Sudan. Essentially the report sought to 
determine the answer to the following questions: which political legacies of colonial rule can be 
identified in the contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity that affect postcolonial Sudan? 
How has political rationality been characterised in postcolonial Sudan? What level of colonial 
influence can be pronounced from this rationality? 
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6.2 Synthesis of empirical findings 
The main empirical points of analysis were chapter specific and were addressed within the 
chapters four and five. These chapters focusing on Sudan as a case study provide the empirical 
perspective for the theoretical framework that is established in chapters two and three. 
This section will synthesize the empirical findings in order to answer the reports above 
mentioned research questions. Chapter four outlined the particularities of Sudan’s two colonial 
periods, how in colonial discourse the impact of imperialism should not be underestimated. It is 
crucial to understand how colonialism operates as an engine of imperialism; authority and 
influence are at the centre of imperialism and the process of agglomerating colonies is how the 
imperial process is exercised. Although colonisation in Africa is a predominantly European 
procedure, the concepts of power and influence are not limited to a geographical location. 
African people have been exercising power and influence to varying degrees over each other 
years before the colonizers arrived on the continent.  
In this sense the dynamics pertaining to the colonised being the colonizer begin to be 
extrapolated in particular the Egyptian empire  exhibits an explicit case of how the colonised 
can colonize their neighbour. The balance between rationality and colonial influence is 
addressed through the elucidation of Egypt’s imperial ambition. The use of cartography and 
landscaping of the historical narrative as a means of exerting influence is indicative of Egypt’s 
strategy to expand their empire; this denotes a rational choice process, in this sense the 
Egyptian imperial project is revealed as a decisive catalyst to Sudan’s identity based 
colonisation. This instance against the backdrop of Turkish and British colonisation highlights 
that in the system of colonisation, the existing differential parameters are exploited by the 
colonizers in order to advance their power and how rationality as a postcolonial phenomenon is 
a construct of imperialism. It can therefore be said that rationality in the Sudanese post colony 
is a characterisation of imperial elements that have converged with the colonial.  
The report has demonstrated how violent atrocities are strategies of entrenched domination. 
How their use is reliant on the need and the context in which the domination takes place, how 
violence is a rationality construct in both the colonial and postcolonial setting. Racial 
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discrimination, coercion and the othering of certain members of the population that are 
deemed as worthy of discrimination is an outcome of the colonial process that is not limited to 
Sudan.  
Those occupying positions of power where critical decisions are made often factor in their 
longevity into their decision making process. The report has demonstrated that Sudan’s 
respective leaders have employed this level of reasoning into their respective forms of 
governance. At the core of the rationality discourse is survival, particularly in the cases of 
Sudan’s prominent leaders, Jaafar al Numayri and Omar al Bashir, who both took actions that 
did not appear to align with a positive political future for Sudan, but what the findings reveal is 
that political rationality extends beyond politics in the administrative and governance sense and 
involves making choices that are primarily based on political survival.  The report has revealed 
that crises and unrest, however heinous can be modes of political rationality application; 
Bahsir’s controversial affiliation with the Janjaweed militia is evidence of this. Scholars have 
grappled with the reasons why the Janjaweed militia that unleashed complete terror and 
caused one of the greatest humanitarian crises of the modern age seemingly enjoyed unlimited 
support from the Sudanese government.  
The report gives insight into this circumstance by framing the context in which the Darfur 
unrest occurs. The Darfur genocide coincides with an emerging peace agreement for the South, 
for an Islamic fundamentalist like Bashir, an impending agreement to peace with a 
predominantly Christian and African South indicated a loss of power, a curtailing of his 
consistent mission to portray Sudan as a homogenous Islamic and Arabic nation state since his 
rise to power in 1989. The Darfur uprisings presented an ample opportunity for Bashir to wage 
a war on adversaries who threatened the vision he had for Sudanese homogeneity since his grip 
on the South was fast becoming obsolete. The support for the Janjaweed speaks to the 
fundamental characteristics of rationality that includes self-interest, weighing of the costs and 
the benefits and the pursuit of an end goal. 
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 In terms of rationality of any kind these parameters are critical and in provide a vital template 
from which to assess state sponsored violence, not only on the continent but also from a global 
perspective.  
6.3 Future direction of research 
The report has presented a number of findings that are important to consider in the field of 
African colonial and postcolonial studies, as well as in the study of violence and atrocities. From 
a global perspective, this report contributes to the greater discourse on violence, atrocities and 
the question of who is to blame when they occur, the findings indicate that even in instances 
where the protagonists of violence are seemingly apparent, the context in which said violence 
occurs is crucial. Since violent atrocities arising from conflict are not limited to Sudan and to 
Africa, the findings provide a broader insight into situations where similar patterns begin to 
develop, indicating that the occurrence of violent atrocities will soon be a likely factor. These 
findings could provide the insight that is needed to be able to pre-empt and therefore prevent 
atrocities before they occur. Apart from genocide, the refugee crisis that the Darfur conflict 
produced forced the world into a global discourse on displacement and the implications it has 
on primarily the countries that border conflict ridden states and to a larger extent what this 
means on a global scale when conflicts and the accompanying violence spills out of the country 
and region and into the wider global community.  The findings from this report provide an 
avenue that facilitates these types of discourses and in light of the numerous refugee crises 
that have developed since the Darfur conflict, displacement, the treatment of refugees in other 
countries and the most effective ways of helping them are some of the themes that require 
urgent global attention.  
What the report sought out to do was to determine the extent to which Africa’s colonial history 
had bearing on the rationality process of the post colony. The findings indicate that the survival 
aspect is exacerbated by a historical aspect that cannot be discounted due to the independence 
of a state and the establishment of administrative apparatus such as a legislature and 
parliament. The fact of prior established colonial structures presents an opportunity for those 
previous colonizers, in the case of Sudan, the British to be active participants in the improving 
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the current status of the country particularly when the state finds itself in turmoil. The report is 
clear in its analysis that Sudan’s contemporary patterns of violence and atrocity have been the 
result of the processes of rationality relating to domestic politics that have played out during 
the tenures of the respective successive governments post-independence.  
Subsequent to this the arising unrest and even the rationality itself has been influenced by 
Sudan’s complex colonial history. As Johnson notes, a great aspect of British departure from 
Sudan stemmed from the colonizer’s need to rid themselves of the responsibility of developing 
Sudan and addressing the issues that stemmed out of the decolonization, the issues they 
contributed to “Sudanese  independence was thrust upon Sudan by a colonial power eager to 
extricate itself from its residual responsibilities.”  (Johnson, 2003:29). It is not a great leap 
therefore to suggest that these findings present not only Britain but all prior colonizers an 
ample opportunity for involvement in a course of action whose terms will be decide by the 
African state in question that will be dedicated to the resolution of conflict, putting an end to 
violence and coming up with a sustainable program for restitution and development.  
From a scholarly and theoretical perspective, the findings of this report contribute to the 
rationality theorems that have been developed in political science. Political rationality has been 
conceptualized along the lines of choice situations which suggest that this presence of agency is 
considerably greater than external or intrinsic influence. The outcomes from the assessment of 
colonial and postcolonial perspectives can contribute to the overall discourse of rationality, the 
various forms in which it can be exercised and how it can help in interpreting information 
regarding the dynamics of conflict and conflict resolution in not only Africa but also on a global 
scale.  
A number of scholars have written on the dynamics of race and tribe in Africa in general and 
also on those racial and tribal dynamics of Sudan in particular. The findings of this report 
contribute to that study and the relations to contemporary patterns of violence are consistent 
with the study presented by Mahmood Mamdani and Crawford Young in particular.  
The insights presented by this report on how historicity, rationality and inherited political 
legacies converge to create optimum conditions for violence can contribute to the literature 
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that analyses emerging patterns of violence. The analysis of these patterns offers valuable 
insight into the nature of atrocities and gives those who are involved in the process of 
formulating and implementing resolutions the necessary tools to be able to implement 
procedures that in addition to addressing the immediate violent situation that are subjecting 
civilians to abhorrent atrocities also helps put procedures in place that will minimize the 
likelihood of further violent atrocities. A crucial first step towards this mammoth task on a 
global is what this report seeks to do and that is remove the conception that violence and 
atrocities are random acts of nature, it is only when the strategic component of violence is 
understood can there be an opportunity for a counter strategy that will be able to effectively 
put an end to it.   
The scale of this discourse and its accompanying arguments is extensive and multifaceted, 
Sudan’s dense and intricate history, the competing arguments pertaining to colonialisms impact 
on the current African landscape and the theorem of political rationality indicate optimum 
opportunity for further exploration. To conceptualize the relationship between political 
rationality in governance and colonial legacies there is a need for more case studies on the 
continental level as this will allow for further assessment of regional dimensions of the subject. 
Going forward, including the exploration of geography and border disputes as future research 
avenues can facilitate the attainment of this dimension. 
It can therefore be said that In spite of what has been commonly understood about rationality 
in the post colony, agency of the postcolonial governing structures and the impact of colonial 
legacies, the main findings of this report have demonstrated that political rationality in the 
postcolonial African context can only account for the contemporary patterns of violence and 
atrocity in Sudan to the extent that it is influenced by the political legacies of Sudan’s colonial 
history. 
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